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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This report documents the system safety analyses and requirements devel-
oped during the Modular Space Station definition study, and fulfills the
contractual requirement for a Safety Analysis Report (DRL 75). Safety criteria
are based on and consistent with those used in the earlier Saturn V launched
station definition studies. Hazards related to design and operations are
identified and residual hazards and unresolved safety issues are documented
herein. Safety criteria are also documented in the Preliminary Performance
Specification (DRL 66) Section 3.1, Performance Requirements. Safety design
requirements are integrated -with the Subsystem Design Requirements in Section
3.3 of DRL 66.
1.1 GOALS .
Since an objective of the Space Station Program is to develop routine
space operations, a very high degree of system safety must be achieved. This
was emphasized in the Modular Space Station definition study by defining a
program-level system safety goal in the Guidelines and Constraints as follows:
Safety is a mandatory consideration through the total
program. As a goal, no single malfunction or credible
combination of malfunctions and/or accidents shall result
in serious injury to personnel or to crew abandonment of
the space station.
As safety criteria and design and operational requirements were developed
for the MSS program, they were tested against this goal to achieve consistency.
Other sources for safety requirements included the Guidelines and Constraints
and prior Space Station programs as applicable.
1.2 SAFETY ANALYSIS
Following the initial definition of safety criteria the system safety
effort concentrated on evaluation of design and operational concepts considered
in the concept trade studies. This process involved identification of potential
hazards, determination of the effects of the hazards and identifying means for
eliminating or reducing the hazards.
During the preliminary design of the final integrated concept the hazard
analysis was conducted in depth as follows:
Identification of Potential Hazards
Hazardous equipment, hazardous operations and potential hazards inherent
in the selected preliminary design and operations were identified by system
safety and subsystem design personnel working on the program. A potential
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hazard was one which could occur, regardless of how unlikely or improbable
its occurrence may have been, and could be identified from the following
sources:
o Hazardous equipment
o Hazardous operations
o Normal .operations
o Credible accidents
o Hardware failures with hazardous effects from the Critical
Function Analyses .
These were identified by subsystem and assembly, and by mission phase
(for hazardous operations).
Determination of Effects of Hazards
The potential effect(s) of each potential hazard were identified
jointly by the system safety engineer and the appropriate design or opera-
tions engineer. In considering what the effects might be, further subsystem
failures or accidents which could result as a consequence of the hazard were
considered. If a hazard could result from a subsequent, non-related, but
credible failure, accident or personnel error, this was defined as an addi-
tional potential hazard.
Hazard Reduction
Requirements for reduction of identified hazards were made in accordance
with the Hazards Reduction Precedence Sequence (HRPS) of NASA OMSF Safety
Program Directive No. 1 - Revision A (SPD-1A). This called for an order of
precedence in identifying requirements as follows:
1. Design for minimum hazard.
2. Safety devices.
3. Warning devices. .
4. Special procedures.
5. Identification as residual hazards.
Residual hazards are defined as those for which safety or warning
devices and special procedures could not be provided for counteracting the
hazard. Consequently where requirements could not be identified which
sufficiently reduced the potential effects of a hazard to an acceptably
safe level, the hazard was identified as a residual hazard (No. 5 on the
HRPS). Where enough information was not available from the Phase B analyses
to ensure a satisfactory resolution of a safety situation, this was identified
as an unresolved safety issue. Residual hazards and unresolved safety issues
are summarized in the following sections of this report.
1.3 RESIDUAL HAZARDS
The last step in the hazard reduction precedence sequence is the identi-
fication of residual hazards , those hazards which have not been eliminated
by alternate designs or have not been reduced to insignificance by safeguards.
-2-
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For example, cryogenic liquid is no longer a hazard because that form of
hydrogen, oxygen, or nitrogen has been eliminated from the design. However,
the presence of high pressure, gaseous hydrogen remains a hazard because of
the potential flame and explosion effects when mixed with normal MSS atmos-
phere. Double containment reduced the hazard to manageable limits, but did
not eliminate the hazard from further consideration. Section 2 of this
report analyzes hazards identified in the MSS Safety Study. Residual hazards
are summarized below:
o Leakage of hydrogen gas inside habitable volumes resulting in
increased flammability and explosion potential.
o Rupture of high pressure tanks with subsequent shrapnel.
o Rupture of module pressure shell resulting in decompression.
o Breakup of control moment gyro rotor or support.
o Susceptibility of IVA and EVA pressure garment to tearing on pro-
truding components.
o Fouling of long IVA hoses on internal components or structure.
o Inability to detect a toxic atmosphere or contaminated food.
o Leakage of external seals, particularly in hatches.
o Residual pressure differential across opening or closing hatches.
o Collision of crewman with sharp equipments during EVA/IVA.
o Fire.
o Meteroid penetration.
o Electric shock.
o Sudden release of station module pressure inside a closed shuttle
cargo bay.
o Damage to station module or shuttle during berthing and docking.
1.4 UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES
Residual hazards which are susceptible to additional study and experi-
mentation have been defined as unresolved safety issues. The issue remains
a hazard but advancement in the state-of-the-art can be immediate and positive
in hazard resolution. Further design and safety efforts in these fields would
be most productive in achieving safety goals. A summary of unresolved safety
issues identified in the MSS safety analysis follows:
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Fire Suppression: Sufficient data are not now available to assure the
adequacy of any fire suppression system selected. Data are required on fire
propagation characteristics, fire detections methods, and the effectiveness
of fire suppression techniques, all under zero-g conditions. The Skylab
program is probably the best but not the only means by which data may be
collected for a rational decision. Combustion analysis and special experi-
ments should be made prior to, concurrently with, and subsequent.to the in-
orbit tests. These results affect all manned space vehicles.
Pressurized Tanks; Some of the pressurized fluid tanks on the station,
(station modules, cargo modules, and power boom) have a high TNT explosive
equivalent; e.g., hydrogen and oxygen storage and accumulator tanks, the
oxygen emergency supply tanks, and the nitrogen 'repressurization tanks.
Explosive rupture of any one of these could be catastrophic. Continued
attention is therefore required so as to ensure that adequate factors of
safety, testing, and in-flight monitoring are provided and that the tanks
are designed and located so that rupture will not destroy or damage the
station. At present, a tank design is not available that has been demonstra-
ted to fail, so as to direct fragments and gases in a predeterminted direction.
Fragment prevention is mandatory for safe operation, and could be achieved
by adequate information about fracture mechanics, pressure cycling effects,
long life stress effects and design methods which produce tank wall opening
without releasing fragments.
Collision with Space Debris; The possibility exists that enough debris
from U.S. and foreign spacecraft may be in intersecting orbits with the station
to pose a significant hazard probability for a ten-year operation. A better
analysis than is presently available is required to determine the probability
of such a collision, and the relative impact velocity. If this is, indeed,
found to be a significant hazard, then means should be evaluated to detect,
track, and predict the paths of such debris; and to provide means for either
removing individual items from collision orbits by the shuttle or other
vehicle, or to provide some means of evasion by providing adequate and timely
delta-V capability at the station.
Shuttle Emergency Capability; Emergency provisions are being provided
on the station for 96 hours, based on the guideline constraint which calls
for 48-hour shuttle capability to rendezvous. The additional 48 hours is
provided for docking, transfer of personnel/cargo, and contingency margin,
or for a second shuttle, if necessary.
Since the safety on the station is contingent on the worst-case shuttle
emergency rendezvous and docking time, the shuttle capability in this respect
should be periodically reevaluated throughout the program. Should the worst
case exceed 96 hours, the station safety provisions must be reevaluated and
updated. . . .
Accidents; There are a number of.potential accidents which could lead
to personnel loss. A continuing effort is therefore required to reduce the
probability of these accidents, to minimize the injury and damage they can
cause, and to provide longer-term means for damage containment and control.
Among these accidents are fire, explosion, and meteroid penetration.
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Sudden Release of Station Module Pressure: The shuttle cargo bay will
be vented to ambient. A maximum differential pressure will be determined
for closed cargo bay-structural strength design. Inclusion of a pressurized
station module in the cargo bay presents a hazard to the assembly because
sudden release of the normal pressure would tend to overpressurize the cargo
bay. Additional study of launch and reentry transients will be required to
select a means of reducing this hazard.
Docking/Berthing; Where large inertias are involved, as between the
shuttle and a module, small errors in closing rate, direction, or location
could result in critical damage. Manual docking/berthing depends on human
performance as well as on mechanical system response. Continued study of
the docking/berthing procedure is necessary to identify the practical safe-
guards to preclude accelerations outside design tolerances.
Toxic Environment Detection; Long periods of unmanned operation could
allow accumulation of toxic gases in the habitable module atmosphere. De^ -
tection means for all possible contaminants have not yet been applied to the
manning operation. Several approaches should be taken; e.g., investigation
of possible contaminants and identification of a set of sensors, or modifica-
tion of the procedures to eliminate the contaminant buildup possibility.
Hatch Operation; Small pressure differences over a large hatch area
could result in hatch accelerations dangerous to the crew and adjacent equip-
ment. Continuing design detail is required to preclude this hazard.
-5-
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2.0 HAZARDS
A number of sources were used to identify the inherent and potential
hazards in the MSS.
1. Results of Space Station Program, Phase B.
2. Hazards arising from equipment failures. ' . •,
3. Hazards inherent in normal and contingency operations.
4. Credible accidents, defined without specifically determining the
cause.
The Phase B S-V Launched Space Station had many of the same character-
istics as the MSS, and some already identified hazards applied to the modular
design. Life support must still be supplied, as well as RCS attitude control
and secondary electrical power. Even though cryogenic hazards have been
eliminated, both hydrogen and oxygen gases are required for the engines,and
fuel cells. Applicable hazards were also identified by reviewing the hazards
checklist formulated from a survey of applicable documents, including the
NASA/MSC Space Flight Hazards Catalog.
Hazards were also identified from critical failures listed in the
Critical Failure Analysis performed by reliability. These considered failures
of equipment to the assembly level and identified hazards according to the
possible effects of the failures: applying to personnel and/or system. The
criticality levels did not deter the classification of a failure mode as a
hazard, because a hazard could exist concurrent with multiple redundancy.
Additional hazards were identified by a review of the planned MSS
operations. Both the hazards inherent in the normal operations and the
potential hazards that would arise in the event of a failure to perform the
desired operations were defined. '
Since the critical function analyses and other sources of hazards have
not considered potential situations (not within human control) arising from
unexpected natural or induced environments, from system failures, or events
such as collision with meteroids or space debris, potential accidents were
identified separately. Each of the 17 identified in Section 2.3 were utilized
in providing configurational and operational requirements for crew survival.'
Immediately following any unavoidable damage to or loss of equipment, pro-
visions were made.
1. to prevent (further) loss of personnel
2. to contain the damage
3. to control the situation (restore to safe conditions), and
4. to provide for restoration of the normal operating condition.
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The accidents were defined so that they were severe enough to impose design
and operational requirements within credible limits. No credible accident
was eliminated from consideration because the design consequences were too
severe.
Hazardous equipment and dangerous materials were summarized from the
previous hazards lists. Equipment was considered hazardous when failure of
that piece of hardware resulted or when .normal operation could result in
injury to personnel or system damage. A valve failing open or closed is not
hazardous, but a valve exploding is a hazard. Dangerous materials were
identified if the potential for fire, toxicity, explosion, or corrosion were
increased significantly. Thus, oxygen was not identified as corrosive but
was listed as increasing the flammability. Inherent hazards were also identi-
fied; e.g., sharp corners on tables and chairs since failure of the hardware
is not necessary to cause loss of personnel.
2.1 SUBSYSTEM HAZARDS
The hazard identification contained within this section delineates
potential hazardous Modular Space Station subsystem failures and operational
conditions which may endanger personnel or lead to. damage or loss of equip-
ment. The subsystem hazards which have been identified emerged from evalua-
tion of the Modular Space Station subsystem critical functions and subsystem
equipment implementing these functions.
Table 2.1-1 lists the potential hazards that have been identified from
the Criticality I and II failure modes as determined by the Critical Function
Analysis. The resulting potential hazard effects associated with each failure
occurrence is indicated as leading to injury or to loss of personnel, or
damage to or loss of equipment.
2.2 HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS
Hazardous operations are defined as those operations during which
personnel .errors, minor accidents or equipment failures could lead to injury
to personnel or damage to equipment. Nonhazardous operations are those which
are tolerant to personnel errors, minor accidents or equipment failures, i.e.,
do not result in injury to personnel or damage to equipment.
Personnel errors to be considered are errors such as operating the wrong
switch, operating switches in the wrong sequence, omitting to operate a switch
when required, misunderstanding a displayed instruction or verbal communica-
tion, operating valves in the wrong direction, etc. Personnel error does not
mean gross operational errors such as, inadvertently depressuring, dumping
computer data, docking at 10 feet per second.
Minor accidents refer to bumping into sharp corners, spilling chemicals,
breaking tools, breaking lamps, etc. It does not refer to the "credible
accidents" which are considered major accidents and which are defined for
separate consideration. •' • •
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Equipment failures refer to component failures, i.e., IFRU failures -
not failures of a complete assembly or subsystem. Component failures have
been identified and analyzed by conducting critical failure analyses (DRL
68, Vol VI). In this report, equipment not directly associated with the
MSS major subsystems (i.e., shuttle manipulator arms and shuttle docking)
are included in the analysis of hazardous operations.
Table 2.2-1 identifies hazardous operations by mission phase.
2.3 CREDIBLE ACCIDENTS
Since the critical functions analysis and other sources of hazards do
not, in general, consider potential situations arising from unexpected
natural or induced environments, gross system failures, or events, such as
collision with meteroids or space debris, which are not within human control,
it was found necessary to identify and define potential accidents that may
occur on or to the space station, and for which it is desired to provide
design and operational features for crew survival. Identified credible
accidents are as follows:
a. Fire - A fire in an area containing subsystems equipment, electrical
wiring or laboratory equipment, which damages and puts out of commission all
unprotected operating equipment in a compartment. A compartment, for this
purpose, is a space which can be closed off by doors and hatches, but which
need not be airtight or pressure tight. Flame propagation will be confined
to the one compartment. Sufficient smoke/fumes will be produced to require
rapid evacuation of the affected compartment by personnel. Personnel in
other areas will be able to continue normal operations, but will require face
masks to enter the affected area. The opening of hatches and other openings
to the affected area will be minimized for 24 hours, while fumes are present.
Electrical cable, service conduits, plumbing lines and ducts may temporarily
become inoperative (e.g., power will be removed from electrical cables, fluid
transfer will be interrupted, etc.) but will not be affected by the fire if
they were designed for fire protection, and will be brought on-line again
after a system checkout, within approximately an hour. Similarly, operating
equipment specifically designed for protection from fire will be temporarily
inactivated, but will be brought on-line again after checkout.
b. Mechanical Damage - Mechanical damage caused by a collision inside
the vehicle with loose out-of-control masses. A momentum equivalent to a
50-pound mass moving at 2 ft/sec will be involved. The collision may occur
with any equipment which is exposed to a collision path (i.e., no intervening
equipment) of approximately five feet or more, but not to primary structure.
The damage will be confined to the equipment within a two-foot radius of the
impact point. All equipment, cables, fluid lines, ducts, etc., will be dama-
ged and put out of commission until they can be repaired/replaced except
equipment which is specifically armored for protection against collision.
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c. Explosion - An explosion of .025 pound TNT equivalent, releasing
50 BTU of energy in the form of heat, shock waves and kinetic and thermal
energy of shrapnel damage will be confined to one compartment and will con-
sist of overpressure, heat shrapnel and atmospheric contaminants. All equip-
ment in the compartment will be damaged and made inoperative unless armor-
plated against this type of explosion. The equipment will require repair/
replacement, depending on the damage such an explosion can produce. Further
hazards which can result in the compartment by such an explosion, such as
fire, etc., should also be considered as part of this accident. Walls and
primary structure, or equipment outside the affected compartment, will not
be damaged.
d. Loss of Pressurization - A loss of pressurization in a module
caused by an accidental penetration of an outside wall or bulkhead, by a
faulty relief valves, or by a leaking pressure seal. The time from detection
of the failure to reaching a nonhabitable environment will be approximately
(TBD) corresponding to a 2-1/2 inches diameter hole. This accident may
require evacuation of the affected pressure isolatable volume and the sub-
sequent detection and repair of the source of leakage by two IVA personnel.
No equipment will be damaged by the accident itself, but since the whole
of the affected pressure volume may be exposed to vacuum conditions, sensitive
equipment may have to be deactivated to survive the period until repressuriza-
tion.
e. Fluid Leakage - Leakage of any gas or liquid which is produced,
stored or routed through the pressurized areas of the vehicle, including
any chemicals used or that may be produced in experiments. The leakage may
occur at any point through which the fluid is routed. The amount of leakage
will vary with the provisions made for detection and with the provisions for
stopping the leakage (dumping the fluid overboard, shutting off the process,
transferring to another tank, etc.). This quantity should be defined for
every potentially hazardous fluid on-board. Following detection, the leakage
may be confined to the affected area by restricting air circulation and pro-
viding a slight dump to vacuum in that area. Damage to equipment (e.g. , from
corrosion, etc.) arid the possible requirement to temporarily evacuate the
area must be considered separately for each on-board fluid.
f. Collision - A grazing collision with another vehicle or with space
debris which damages equipment outside the spacecraft such as RCS jets, radia-
tors, solar panels, antennas, tanks, fluid lines, docking mechanisms, etc.
The collision is not severe enough to cause a penetration of primary structure,
but may damage exposed equipment over a circular area of approximately three-
foot diameter in any module or the solar array structure. The damage will
require maintenance/repair/replacement to restore the function. If the equip-
ment is not maintainable/repairable/replaceable, the damage is to be regarded
as permanent.
g. Personnel Loss - The loss of any one man through injury, illness,
or death. Provisions must be made for medical treatment until his return to
earth, and for cross-training to allow other personnel to take over duties
necessary for crew safety.
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h. Food or Water Contamination - Biological or toxic contamination of
food or potable water'supply. All similarly packaged food stored in any
one module will be assumed unfit to eat. Similarly, all potable water in
connected tanks will also be assumed toxic; the water, however, may be repro-
cessed through the water purification system and the tanks decontaminated
to render it potable.
i. Accident in a Hatch - The loss of access to any one hatch assembly,
door or other personnel or cargo transfer opening because of jamming of the
mechanism, either -open or closed, or because of obstruction by cargo, or
because of a localized hazardous situation (fire, chemical spillage, electri-
cal hazard, etc.). The hazardous or non- accessible area may extend over a
volume of about 5 ft x 5 ft x 5 ft and be situated anywhere within five feet
of the edge of the hatch or opening. .
This accident is not to be considered credible where two independent
methods for opening a hatch have been provided and where special provisions
have been taken to avoid hazardous equipment in the vicinity of the hatch.
j. Incapacitated 'EVA or IVA Man - An out-of-control and incapacitated
man performing EVA or IVA. Rescue is required within five minutes by a
companion already suited and conditioned to the suit atmosphere, who is
waiting in -an airlock or is also performing EVA or IVA.
k. Meteroid Penetration - Meteroid penetration of the primary structure.
The results, will be similar to an explosion, as described in item c, releasing
50 BTU of energy. Such a meteroid has a 10~3 probability of impact in 10
years, and the meteroid is approximately 0.6-inch diameter. Physical .damage
will be confined to one compartment (see definition if item a), and will
consist of finely divided molten high-speed shrapnel (from spallation of
the inner wall). All equipment in the compartment will be damaged and made .
inoperative, unless armor-plated for protection against this type of shrapnel.
Damaged equipment will require extensive, repair/replacement. Further hazards
which can result in the compartment by such an accident, such as fire, etc.,
should also be considered as part of this accident. The resulting penetration
of the pressure wall will be 2-1/2 inches in diameter and will cause depress-
urization of the vehicle to an unsafe level in approximately (TBD).
1. Loss of Electrical Power - Loss of the availability of electrical
power from like power sources (all solar panels, or all fuel cells, or all
batteries) in one pressure volume or all inverters in one volume, as the
result of an accident and/or.a sequence of unexpected failures. The loss
will be immediate with no advanced warning.
m. Atmospheric Contamination - Atmospheric contamination by toxic or
otherwise hazardous contaminants that will require personnel evacuation from
one pressure isolatable volume within two minutes of detection. The affected
volume will require either purging to vacuum and subsequent pressurization
or, if the contaminant can be removed by the ECLSS, will require processing
of the atmosphere for two days to restore a habitable environment. The other
pressure volume will remain habitable.
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n. Electrical Shock - Electrical shock to any one man while performing
maintenance or working .with electrical or electronic: equipment or experiments.
The shock may result in momentary (seconds to minutes) loss of performance
capability by the man, to injury to the man's emergency return to earth,
and/or loss of life.
0. Hazard in a Docked Module - A hazard appearing on. a docked cargo,
experiments or other module, which arises from any of the above accidents
occurring on the module, as applicable. The module is to be considered as
a separate pressure volume from the point of view of isolation, containment
and control. If required, access to a depressurized or contaminated module
will be by two IVA or EVA personnel.
p. Module Abandonment - A combination of accidents and/or equipment
degradation requiring the return of any one module to earth for repair or
replacement. The crew must operate in the remainder of the station at a
reduced level until the module can be replaced on the station.
q. Station Abandonment - A combination of accidents and/or subsystems •
degradation requiring the abandonment of the station by some- of all of the
occupying personnel. Such abandonment will not be a:time-critical emergency,
but a deliberate abandonment planned over a period of days to months. The
worst design case is when one of the separate pressure volumes has been evac-
uated and sealed off for up to 30 days because of major damage or contamination,
and all personnel are in the remaining volume. Furthermore, subsystems degra-
dation is now becoming apparent in this volume, resulting in the decision to
abandon; such subsystems as are capable of survival must be set in a passiva-
ted or quiescent mode to-ensure safe personnel escape and to minimize damage
for possible reoccupation at a later date. . .
2.4 HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT
This section contains a list, Table 2.4-1, of hazardous equipment
'identified for the station's major subsystems. The potential hazards
associated with this equipment can be the result of normal operation as
well as abnormal operation. Hazardous equipment is identified by any one
of the following characteristics:.
1. Equipment that contains sufficient releasable energy (kinetic,
potential, pressure, thermal, chemical, etc.) to cause injury
to personnel or damage to equipment if release at normal or
maximum possible rates. Examples are a high-pressure hose and
the docking operation. These contain enough energy to injure
personnel or damage equipment even though it takes certain fail-
ures and/or accidents, credible or incredible, to release the
energy and do the damage.
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2. Equipment that contains or has the potential for producing toxic
materials, corrosives, radiations, or environments, in concentra-
tions which are injurious to personnel or equipment. Examples
are RCS using hydrogen (explosive) and electrical equipment
(electric shock). Again "how" the material or environment is
released, or its credibility, is not considered in determining
what is and what is not hazardous equipment.
3. Equipment that has the potential of triggering off a high-energy
release or the production of toxic materials, corrosives, radia-
tions or injurious environments. Examples are electrical equipment
(ignition source), chisel-like tools and implements (can penetrate
pressure walls).
Table 2.4rl. Hazardous Equipment List
Hazardous Equipment Potential Hazards
1. Gas storage accumulators
2. Water electrolysis unit
3. Fuel cell
4. Thermal control (freon) loop
5. Fire extinguishers
6. Control moment gyros
7. H20 tanks
8. Sabatier reactor
9. Freezer/refrigerator
10. Microwave oven
11. IVA/EVA pressure suit
Rupture of pressure vessel (Energy
equivalent to approximately .08 Ib to
6;5 Ib of TNT per accumulator)
Leakage of combustible gas
Leakage of combustible gas (H2)
Leakage of toxic gas
(Dichlorofluorome thane, Freon 21)
Rupture of pressure vessel (C02)
Breakup of rotor or failure of support
attachment
Equipment damage caused by uncontrolled
release of H20
Leakage of combustible and toxic gas
(CH4)
Leakage of toxic gas (Freon)
Radiation leakage
Crew injury from interlock failure and
crew error
Pressure decay from suit damage
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Table 2.4-1. Hazardous Equipment List (Cont)
Hazardous Equipment Potential Hazards
12. PLSS
13. Emergency 02
14. Shuttle manipulator arms
15. Module pressure shell.
16. Module support structure
in shuttle cargo bay
17. High pressure gas storage
Loss of oxygen content
Rupture of 02 storage vessel or loss
of oxygen content
Malfunctions of control/stop mechanism
Rapid decompression
During transport, shuttle cargo bay
overpressurization
Launch or reentry forces could cause
internal collision damage
Explosion in power module or cargo
module
2.5 DANGEROUS MATERIALS
Elimination of dangerous materials has been the goal in the MSS design.
Notably, transport of water has been used to supply hydrogen and oxygen to
the orbiting station. The products of electrolysis can be used in the
reaction control engines and as the oxygen supply to the crew. Thus, trans-
port and storage of a relatively common fluid under low pressure has decreased
the need for high-pressure or cryogenic gas containers and has provided sev-
eral sources for backup supply. The use of hydrazine in the RCS engines was
rejected because of features necessary to contain the extra hazards involved
with the toxic and explosive fluid.
Residual dangerous materials have been placed in double containers to
reduce the hazard of leakage into habitable volumes and, where possible,
have been located away from crew:
1. Freon for the external heat exchangers - Components internal to the
station modules are double contained. The intermediate space between
the component and the habitable volume can be vented to space. Freon
is toxic to crew, but can be detected readily. Should the volume
become contaminated, sufficient time is available for evacuation of
the crew; and restoration of a habitable atmosphere can be accompli-
shed by dumping of freon in that module and repressurization.
Hydrogen for the RCS from power module storage and from the electro-
lysis units - Components and lines internal to the station modules
are double contained. Hydrogen concentration in a normal atmosphere
results in an explosive or flammable mixture. Even though a source
of energy must be supplied for ignition, the mixture is a potential
hazard to personnel and hardware.
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3. Vent gases from the Sabatier process contain methane - the entire
vent system is double contained. Release of methane is toxic and
flammable but readily detectable.
Additional dangerous materials have not been considered hazardous
enough for double containment, but have been carefully contained and
controlled.
1. Oxygen for the RCS and for the crew.atmosphere - Increasing the
concentration of oxygen in the habitable atmosphere increases the
;
 susceptibility of normal materials to fire. However, the presence
of nitrogen continues to be a diluent and fire retardant within
detectable pressure increases. Redundant means of oxygen content
measurement will provide early detection of any problem.
2. Urine from the crew - The corrosive ability of urine is well known,
The extended time necessary to accomplish significant'damage to
exposed- equipment (particularly, electrical connectors) is avail-
able because of the expected duration of the MSS mission.
3. Potassium hydroxide for fuel cell operation - This caustic compound
is damaging to human tissues, but release is very unlikely since
containment is provided in individual cans; i.e., no handling ,of
potassium hydroxide outside of the can.
Many materials have not been considered hazardous because of the MSS
mixed atmosphere. A pure oxygen atmosphere would preclude such materials
as teflon and rubber because of the flammability. 'Even in zero gravity,
a residual flame continues (at least for the zero-g time experienced in
airplane tests)* This problem should be studied more completely.
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3.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Safety requirements for the Modular Space Station were stated .initially
in the NASA Guidelines and Constraints document. These .were reviewed and
restated as general safety criteria in the System Requirements Book (SRB).
As the study progressed, additional safety criteria and, design requirements
were developed and published in the SRB. They appear in final-form in
Section 3.1 of .this report and are documented in Section, 3.1;3.7 of.DRL 66,
Preliminary Performance Specification. Specific subsystem safety design
requirements are listed in Section 3.2 of this-report .and .are documented
in the various subsystem sections of DRL 66.
 :
3.1 SAFETY CRITERIA
Safety is a mandatory consideration through the total program. As a
goal, no single malfunction or credible combination of malfunctions and/or
accidents shall result in serious injury to personnel or to crew abandonment
o f t h e space station. . . .
A. Provisions shall be made for the protection and survival of the
whole crew during solar storm activity as defined by the design
mission radiation model (Paragraph 3.1.3.4, DRL 66).- The radiation
dosage limitations defined in Paragraph 3.1.1 C, DRL 66 shall apply.
B. Personnel escape routes shall be provided in all hazardous situa-
tions. A design goal shall be to provide alternate escape routes
that do not terminate into a common module area. .
C. The space station shall be divided into at least two pressurized
habitable volumes so that any damaged module can be isolated as
required. Accessible modules will be equipped and provisioned so
that the crew can safely continue a degraded mission and take
corrective action to either repair or replace the, damaged module.
D. Provisions and habitable facilities shall be adequate to sustain
the entire crew for a minimum of 96 hours during an emergency
situation requiring shuttle rescue.
E. Atmospheric stores and subsystem capacity, sufficient for one-
repressurization shall be maintained on/at the space station during
manned operations to independently supply each pressurized habitable
volume. .
F. Access to.EVA and IVA airlock suit station(s) shall be.provided for
all credible emergency conditions. Airlock chamber(s) shall.be
provided to permit crew access for EVA/IVA operations.
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G. Two or more suited crewmen will participate in any pressure suit
activity and rescue provisions will be provided.
H. The atmosphere constituents, including harmful airborne trace
contaminants and odors will be monitored and controlled in each
pressurized habitable volume.
I. Identified hazards shall be eliminated, reduced to controlled
hazards, or specified as residual hazards.
•
J. Capability shall be provided for performing critical functins at an
emergency level until the .crew can be rescued, with any one pressure
isolatable volume and the supplies and equipment within it unavail-
able. If the crew is divided into two or more pressure isolatable
volumes which are not shirtsleeve connected, then each of these
volumes shall be capable of sustaining the whole crew. Electrical
and fluid lines in the affected volume required for critical functions
shall be protected against the effects of explosion, fire, vacuum,
and corrosion.
K. Capability shall be provided for performing critical functions
with the portion of any one subsystem in one pressure isolatable
volume inactivated as a result of an accident and a portion of the
subsystem in the other pressure isolatable volume(s) inoperative
for maintenance.
L. For those malfunctions and/or hazards which may result in time-
critical emergencies, provision shall be made for the automatic
switching to a safe mode of operation and for caution and warning
of personnel.
M. Two or more entry/egress' paths shall be provided to and from every
module, pressure isolatable volume, or other area with restricted
access. The two paths shall be separated by airtight partitions,
or shall be at least 10 feet apart, and shall each lead to an area
in which the crew can survive until shuttle rescue or resupply.
N. Provisions shall be made for detectingContaining (i.e., confining)
and controlling (i.e., restoring to a safe condition) emergencies
such as fires, toxic contamination, depressurization, structural
damage, etc.
0. Primary pressure structural materials shall be non-flammable.
Interior walls and secondary structure shall be self-extinguishing.
P. All continuous nonmetallic materials shall be self-extinguishing
in the most severe oxidizing environment to which they will be
exposed. Means shall be provided for fireproof storage of medical
supplies, maintenance supplies, food, tissue, clothing, trash,
and for other non-self-extinguishing items, when they are not
in use.
-30-
SD 71-224
Space Division
North American Rockwell
Q. Materials used in the habitable areas shall not outgas toxic
constituents in the lowest pressure environment to which they
will be exposed.
R. Potentially explosive containers such as high pressure vessels or
volatile gas storage containers shall be placed outside of and as
remotely as possible from personnel living and operating quarters.
Wherever possible the containers shall be isolated and protected
so that failure of one will not propagate to others.
S. Redundant equipment, lines, cables, and utility runs which are.
critical for safety of personnel or mission continuation shall
either be located and routed in separate compartments (i.e.,
separated by a structural wall) or shall be protected against fire,
smoke, contamination, overpressure, and shrapnel.
T. All walls, bulkheads, hatches and seals whose integrity is required
to maintain pressurization shall be readily accessible for inspection
and repair by crewmen in pressurized suits.
U. All EVA and unpressurized compartment IVA shall be conducted using
the "buddy system". The buddy system shall also be used during
shirtsleeve operations in hazardous areas.
V. A margin of consumables shall be provided onboard, sufficient for
performing critical functions for 96 hours at a reduced level
following any credible accident which renders one pressure isolata-
ble compartment unavailable.
W. The capability shall be provided on the space station for the
detection of malfunctions and/or hazards, tracing to the failed
replaceable unit and the display of information to the crew
necessary for corrective action.
X. Range safety requirements at Kennedy Space Center and the Air
Force Eastern Test Range shall apply. Waivers required to meet
mission requirements will be identified.
Y. At least two egress paths shall be available from each module for
emergency egress of personnel during manned ground operations.
Z. Emergency suits required in the space station core module" shall be
in readily accessible locations within each pressure isolatable
volume.
AA. Provisions shall be made for emergency medical treatment for
durations compatible with the rescue provisions.
BB. The safe environment and the safe operational status or activated
subsystems within the space station shall be verified prior to
personnel etnry, initially and prior to re-entry following temporary
station abandonment.
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CC. Deployment and initiation of operations considered hazardous shall
be checked out from a safe location before exposing crewmen to the
potential hazards.
DD. All EVA shall be conducted either using the "buddy system" or within
visual range of a suited crewman ready to exit.
EE. Provision shall be made for the return of a crewmen incapacitated
while performing EVA.
FF. Provisions shall, be made for the containment and/or disposal of
. toxic contaminants.
GG. Provide containment of all materials requiring return via the
shuttle to prevent contamination of the environment and reduce
the hazard of potential fire and toxic conditions.
HH. Tanks used as gas accumulators in inhabited areas shall be designed
to a factor of safety of 4.0 as a minimum. Tank supports shall be
designed to restrain the tank under propulsive effect of rapidly
escaping gas.
II. Design provisions shall be incorporated to prevent uncontrollable
hatch opening due to pressure differentials.
3.1.1 Credible Accidents
The space station shall be designed and operated so that crew survival
and station survival will be ensured following the accidents defined herewith.
A. Fire
A fire in an area containing subsystems equipment, electrical
wiring or laboratory equipment, which damages and puts out of
commission all unprotected operating equipment in a compartment;
A compartment, for this purpose, is a space which can be closed
off by doors and hatches, but which need not be airtight or
pressure tight. Flame propagation will be confined to the one
compartment. Sufficient smoke/fumes will be produced to require
rapid evacuation of the affected compartment by personnel. Per-
sonnel in other areas will be able to continue normal operations,
. but will require face masks to enter the affected area. The open-
ing of hatches and other openings to the affected area will be
minimized for 24 hours, while fumes are present. Electrical cable,
service conduits, plumbing lines and ducts may temporarily become
inoperative (e.g., power will be removed from electrical cables,
fluid transfer will be interrupted, etc.) but will not be affected
by the fire if they were designed for fire protection, and will be
brought on-line again after a system checkout, within approximately
an hour. Similarly, operating equipment specifically designed for
protection from fire will be temporarily inactivated, but will be
brought on-line again after checkout.
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B. Mechanical Damage
Mechanical damage caused by a collision inside the vehicle with
loose out-of-control masses. A momentum .equivalent to a-.50 Ib.
mass moving at 2 ft/sec will be involved. The collision may occur
with any equipment which is exposed to a collision path (i.e., no
intervening equipment) of approximately five feet or more, but not
to primary structure. The damage will be confined to the equipment
within a two foot radius of the impact point. All equipment, cables,
fluid lines, ducts, etc. will be damaged and put out of commision
until they can be repaired/replaced except equipment which is
specifically armored for protection aginst collision. •
C.. Explosion • .
An explosion of..025. Ib TNT equivalent, releasing 50 BTU of energy
in the form of heat, shock waves and kinetic and thermal energy of
shrapnel damage will be confined to one compartment (see definition
in Item A) and will consist of overpressure, heat, shrapnel and
atmospheric contaminants. All equipment in the compartment will
be damaged and made inoperative, unless armor plated for protection
against this type of explosion. The equipment will require repair/
replacement, depending on the damage such an explosion can produce.
Further hazards which can result in the compartment by such an
explosion, such as fire, etc., should also be considered as part
. of this accident. Walls and primary structure, or equipment out-
side the affected compartment, will not be damaged.
D. Loss of Pressurization .. •
A loss of pressurization in a module caused by an accidental penetra-
ion of an outside wall or bulkhead, by a faulty relief valve, or
by a leaking pressure.seal. The time from detection of the failure
to reaching a non-habitable environment will be approximately (TBD)
corresponding to a 2-1/2 inches diameter hole. This accident may
require evacuation of the affected pressure isolatable volume and
the subsequent detection and repair of the source of leakage by
two IVA personnel. No equipment will be damaged by the accident
itself. But since the whole of the affected pressure volume may
be exposed to vacuum conditions, sensitive equipment may have to
be deactivated to survive the period until repressurization.
E. Fluid Leakage .
Leakage of any gas or liquid which is produced, stored or routed
through the pressurized areas of the vehicle, including any chemicals
used or that may be produced in experiments.. The leakage may occur
at any point through which the fluid is routed. The amount of leak-
age will vary with the provisions made for detection and with the
.provisions for stopping the leakage (dumping the fluid overboard,
shutting off the process, .transferring to another tank, etc.). This
quantity should be defined for every potentially hazardous fluid
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E. Fluid Leakage (Cont)
onboard. Following detection, the leakage may be confined to the
affected area by restricting air circulation and providing a
slight dump to vacuum in that area. Damage to equipment (e.g. ,
from corrosion, etc.) and the possible requirement to temporarily
evacuate the area must be considered separately for each onboard
fluid.
F. Collision
A grazing collision with another vehicle or with space debris
which damages equipment outside the spacecraft, such as RCS jets,
radiators, solar panels, antennas, tanks, fluid lines, docking
mechanisms, etc. The collision is not severe enough to cause a
penetration of primary structure, but may damage exposed equipment
over a circular area of approximately three foot diameter. The
damage will require maintenance/repair/replacement, to restore
the function. If the equipment is not maintainable/repairable/
replaceable, the damage is to be regarded as permanent.
G. Personnel Loss
The loss of any one man through injury, illness, or death. Pro-
visions must be made for medical treatment until his return to
Earth, and for cross-training to allow other personnel to take
over duties necessary for crew safety.
H. Food or Water Contamination
Biological or toxic contamination of food or potable water supply.
All similarly packaged food stored in any one module will be
assumed unfit to eat. Similarly all potable water in connected
tanks will also be assumed toxic, the water however may be repro-
cessed through the water purification system and the tanks decon-
taminated to render it potable.
I. Accident in a Hatch
The loss of access to any one hatch assembly, door or other
personnel or cargo transfer opening because of jamming of the
mechanism, either open or closed, or because of obstruction by
cargo, or because of a localized hazardous situation (fire,
chemical spillage, electrical hazard, etc.). The hazardous or
non-accessible area may extend over a volume of about 5 ft x 5 ft
x 5 ft and be situated anywhere within 5 ft of the edge of the
hatch or opening.
This accident is not to be considered credible where two independent
methods for opening a hatch have been provided and where special
provisions have been taken to avoid hazardous equipment in the
vicinity of the hatch.
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J. Incapacitated EVA or IVA Man
An out-of-control and incapacitated man performing EVA or IVA.
Rescue is required within 5 minutes by a companion already .suited
and conditioned to the suit atmosphere, who is waiting in an
airlock or is also performing EVA or IVA.
K. Meteroid Penetration
Meteroid penetration of the primary structure. The results will
be similar to an explosion, as described in Item C, releasing 50
BTU of energy. Such a meteroid has a 10"-* probability of impact
in 10 years and the meteroid is approximately 0.6 inches in diameter.
Physical damage will be confined to one compartment (see definition
in Item A), and will consist of finely divided molten high speed
shrapnel (from spallation of the inner wall). All equipment in
the compartment will be damaged and made inoperative, unless armor
plated for protection against this type of shrapnel. Damaged
equipment will require extensive repair/replacement. Further
hazards which can result in the compartment by such an accident,
such as fire, etc., should also be considered as part of this
accident. The resulting penetration of the pressure wall will be
2-1/2 inches in diameter and will cause depressurization of the
vehicle to an unsafe level in approximately (TBD).
L. Loss of Electrical Power
Loss of the availability of electrical power from like power
sources (all solar panels, or all fuel cells, or all batteries)
in one pressure volume or all inverters in one volume, as the
result of an accident and/or a sequence of unexpected failures.
The loss will be immediate with no advanced warning.
M. Atmospheric Contamination
Atmospheric contamination by toxic or otherwise hazardous contami-
nants that will require personnel evacuation from one pressure
isolatable volume within two minutes of detection. The affected
volume will require either purging to vacuum and subsequent re-
pressurization, or, if the contaminant can be removed by the
ECLSS, will require processing of the atmosphere for two days
to restore a habitable environment. The other pressure volume
will remain habitable.
N. Electrical Shock
Electrical shock to any one man while performing maintenance or
working with electrical or electronic equipment or experiments.
The shock may result in momentary (seconds to minutes) loss of
performance capability by the man, to injury requiring the man's
emergency return to Earth, and/or loss of life.
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0. Hazard in a Docked Module
A hazard appearing on a docked cargo, experiments or other module,
which arises from any of the above accidents occurring on the
module, as applicable. The module is to be considered as a
separate pressure volume from the point of view of isolation,
containment and control. If required, access to a depressurized
or contaminated module will be by two IVA or EVA personnel.
P . Module Abandonment " ' . _ ' .
A combination of accidents and/or equipment degradation requiring
the return of any one module to Earth, for repair or replacement.
The crew must operate in the remainder of the station at a reduced
level until the module can be replaced on the station.
Q. Station Abandonment
A combination of accidents and/or subsystems degradation requiring
the abandonment of the station by some or all of the occupying
personnel. Such abandonment will not be a time-critical emergency,
but a deliberate abandonment planned over a period of days to
months. The worst design case is when one of the separate pressure
volumes has been evacuated and sealed off for up to 30 days because
of major damage or contamination, and all personnel are in the
remaining volume. Furthermore, subsystems degradation is now
becoming apparent in this volume, resulting in the decision to
abandon, such subsystems as are capable of survival must be set
in a passivated or quiescent mode to ensure safe personnel escape
and to minimize damage for possible reoccupation at a later date.
3.1.2 Dangerous Materials and Components
A. Toxic fluid containers shall be located in unpressurized volumes,
or shall be double contained with the capability of dumping the
fluid to space.or off-loading to another double container, and
of venting the space between the two containers.
B. Double contained toxic fluid containers shall be provided with
means to detect leakage of the toxic fluid into the space between
the containers, and with means to detect penetration of the outside
container.
C. Means shall be provided for detecting a toxic environment within
a space station module containing toxic or potentially toxic
fluids.
D. Special protective garments and equipment shall be provided for
personnel working near potentially toxic MSS elements during
ground handling or working in a toxic environment.
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Capability shall be provided to purge or dump to space a toxically
contaminated atmosphere in a pressurized module.
Hazardous fluids or materials will be double contained during
handling and transfer in pressurized areas. Capability shall be
provided to verify the integrity of both containers before and
after transfer.
Capability shall be provided to vent the space between double
walled containers for hazardous fluid handling to space and
dumping the fluid to space or off-loading to another container.
Procedures shall be available for transferring hazardous fluids,
or materials in a pressurized area from a singly penetrated
double container to a.storage container without releasing fluid
or material to the MSS atmosphere.
During handling and transfer of hazardous fluids or materials,
no other manned operations shall be planned along the transfer
path.
The pressures, temperatures, or other parameters which indicate
the status of hazardous fluids or materials shall be verifiable.
Transfer lines for hazardous fluids shall be located outside the
pressurized vessels or shall be double walled with the capability
of venting the space between the two containers to space.
3.2 SUBSYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
3.2.1 General
A. Equipment in pressurized areas which is required for safety of
personnel or mission continuation shall be capable of surviving,
active or dormant, in a depressurized environment for a time
period sufficient to ensure re-establishment of a pressurized
atmosphere in a damaged volume, but in any case for a minimum
of 48 hours..
B. Factors of Safety - The following factors of safety (Table 3.2.1-1)
shall be used for structural design, applied to limit load:
Table 3.2.1-1. Factors of Safety for Structures
Condition
Factor of Safety
Ultimate Yield
Unmanned
Manned
Long-Term Sustained Loads
Short-Term Transient Loads
1.50
2.00
1.75
1.20
1.50
1.30
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C. Limit Condition - No system shall be designed incapable of
functioning at limit load conditions.
D. Fail Safe - System or component failure shall not propagate
sequencially; i.e., design shall fail safe.
E. Design Margins - All space station systems shall be designed
to positive margins of safety. Conservative factors of safety
shall be provided where critical, single point failure modes of
operation cannot be eliminated.
F. All critical life limited components and subsystems shall be
designed to allow ground and orbit inspection.
G. Space station configuration design and arrangements shall provide
access for inspection of critical hardware, including pyrotechnics
(on the ground) after device installation.
H. All components associated with enabling the crew to recognize,
isolate, and correct critical subsystem malfunctions for a given
space station module must be located onboard and be functionally
independent of ground support and external interfaces.
I. Onboard equipment will be provided for checkout, monitoring,
warning, and fault isolation to a level consistent with safety
and with the in-orbit maintenance and repair approach selected.
Emergency control and repair approach selected. Emergency control
and repair of failures or damage will also be provided.
J. Primary pressure structural materials shall be non-flammable.
Interior walls and secondary structure shall be self-extinguishing.
K. All continuous nonmetallic materials shall be self-extinguishing
in the most severe oxidizing environment to which they will be
exposed. Means shall be provided for fireproof storage of medical
supplies, maintenance supplies, food, tissue, clothing, trash,
and for other non-self-extinguishing items, when they are not in
use..
L. Materials used in the habitable areas shall not outgas toxic
constituents in the lowest pressure environment to which they
will be exposed.
M. Potentially explosive containers such as high pressure vessels
or volatile gas storage container shall be placed outside of
and as remotely as possible from personnel living quarters.
The containers shall be isolated and protected so that failure
of one will not propagate to others.
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N. Redundant equipment, lines, cables, and utility runs which are
critical for safety of personnel or mission continuation shall
either be located and routed in separate compartments (i.e.,
separted by a structural wall) or shall be protected against
fire, smoke, contamination, overpressure, and shrapnel.
0. Utilities Distribution
1. Hazardous fluid and gas lines shall be double-walled and
vented, and shall be barriered or physically separated
from power wires and each other.
2. GH2 and G02 lines shall be barriered or separated from
each other.
3. Individual ducting shall be provided in all functional areas
for the purpose of maintaining a space station atmosphere
which is compatible with the crew comfort requirements.
Particular emphasis shall be placed on the location of
return air ducts from locations which may contribute
unpleasant or toxic constituents (e.g., galley, personal
hygiene areas, and experiment work areas).
P. Containers and lines for toxic gases shall be placed outside of
or as remotely as possible from personnel living and operating
quarters, and whenever possible, isolated and/or protected.
Provisions shall be made for the detection, containment (i.e.,
confining) and control (i.e., restoring to a safe condition) of
leaks and other potential hazards arising from such equipment.
Q. Critical on-board subsystems will be designed to minimize risk
of loss of modules, injury to crew, or damage to shuttle and
other interfacing vehicles.
3.2.2 Operating Subsystems
3.2.2.1 Structural and Mechanical Subsystems
A. The space station core module shall be divided into two (or more)
separately pressurizable volumes. Each volume will be capable
of being sealed off from the other volume(s) and of holding the
maximum atmospheric design pressure without structural failures,
while the other volume is evacuated, partially pressurized, or
pressurized at the maximum design pressure.
B. Staterooms, laboratories, toilets and other areas with restricted
access shall provide two separate entry/egress paths for personnel.
The two separate paths shall, where possible, lead to different
areas on the deck. Where it is not practical to provide doors or
normal access routes, the second entry/egress paths may be provided
by knock-out panels for emergency use. These should be capable of
being opened from either side.
-39-
SD 71-224
Space Division
North American Rockwell
C. At least two egress paths shall be available from each press-
urizable volume for emergency egress of personnel during manned
ground operations. One external emergency exit shall be available
on each pressure volume. The external emergency exits will open
outwards and will be compatible with escape provisions in ground
operations.
D. Dual Egress
1.' Dual egress capability shall be provided from all modules at
all stages of buildup. Provisions may be IVA or EVA.
2. Dual shirtsleeve egress shall be provided after initial
manning for all modules which are occupied greater than
2 percent of the crew hours available per month. For
modules which are not occupied greater than 2 percent of
time, dual egress is required; but IVA or EVA egress is
acceptable.
E. An internal airlock will be provided which allows for the transfer
of IVA personnel between adjacent separately pressurizable volumes
when a pressure differential exists or one volume is contaminated.
It shall be capable of accommodating two pressure-suited men with
backpacks or with umbilicals. One may be incapacitated. Transfer
of the two men shall be possible unaided by other personnel. The
airlock shall be capable of pressurized or depressurized operation
with either of the two connecting volumes depressurized. Use of
the airlock shall not cause a rate of pressure drop of more than
0.5 psi/sec. In the connecting volumes for normal operations
higher rates,are acceptable for emergencies. Three uses of the
airlock (entry and return into an unpressurized volume) shall
not cause the atmospheric pressure in the pressurized volume to
drop below 62 percent of the normal operating pressure.
F. The capability shall be provided which allows the transfer of
EVA personnel from one of the pressurizable volumes to and from
space. It shall be capable of accommodating two pressure-suited
men with backpacks or with umbilicals. One EVA man may be incapa-
citated. Transfer of the two men shall be possible unaided by the
other personnel. The airlock shall be capable of pressurized or
depressurized operation with the connecting volume(s) either press-
urized or depressurized. Use of the airlock shall not cause a rate
of pressure drop of more than 0.5 psi/sec. In the connecting volumes
for normal operations, higher rates are acceptable for emergencies.
Three uses of the airlock (exit and return) shall not cause the
atmospheric pressure in any pressurized volume to drop below 62
percent of the normal operating pressure.
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G. The station module shall be capable of being used as an EVA
airlock. Provisions shall be made for pres.surizing from inside
the common module and from the remainder of the space station.
Depressurization shall be possible from inside the station module,
the rest of the space station, and from outside of the station
module. An EVA hatch of 3 feet minimum diameter shall be provided
at the opposite end of the module from the berthing port.
H. The flexports shall be provided with a normally habitable atmos-
phere at all times except when used as an airlock.
I. The flexports shall be located so that the openings into the
common module are at least 10 feet distance from the berthing
port hatch of the core module.
J. Modules with planned manned occupancy of more than 15 hours per
month shall be provided with dual shirtsleeve entry/egress paths.
Modules with planned manned occupancy of less than 15 hours per
month shall be provided with dual shirtsleeve entry/egress paths,
or with one shirtsleeve and one EVA or IVA path.
K. A refuge area, pressure isolatable, is required at far end of the
power module. The far end of the power module should also contain
an EVA airlock.
L. Access to EVA and IVA airlock suit station(s) shall be provided
for all 'credible emergency conditions. Airlock chamber(s) shall
be provided to permit crew access for EVA/IVA operations.
M. Design provisions shall be incorporated to prevent uncontrolled
hatch opening due to pressure differential.
N. All walls, bulkheads, hatches, and seals whose integrity is
required to maintain pressurization shall be readily accessible
for inspection and repair by crewmen in pressurized suits.
0. EVA/IVA Provisions
1. EVA/IVA airlocks shall be located to permit EVA and IVA crew
access to and from each pressure isolatable volume. There
shall be at least one IVA airlock and this will allow IVA
into each pressure isolatable volume. There shall be at
least one EVA airlock accessible from either pressure isola-
table volume independent of any one EVA airlock. Airlocks
in this context can be defined as a specially designed inter-
mediate chamber, individual module,.pressure volume, or
variation thereof which can satisfy the IVA/EVA function
requirements.
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2. The capability for rapid depressurization and repressurization
of the EVA/IVA airlocks is required. Depressurization control
shall be possible from inside and outside the space station as
well as from inside the airlock. Repressurization control
shall be possible from both inside the space station and inside
the airlock.
3. All IVA hatches shall be capable of operation from either side
of the hatch, and a capability for equalization of pressure
across the hatch shall be provided.
4. Opening of hatches used for EVA must be possible from both
inside and outside the space station.
P. Berthing/Docking Port Requirements
1. Provide a backup berthing port on the station at each stage
of buildup which allows shuttle berthing and a continuation
of buildup.
2. Provide capability to maintain ports and mechanisms on station
modules in orbit.
3. Provide one more berthing port on each pressure isolatable
volume of the core module than is required for normal build-
up, capable of berthing any planned common module. Provide
an emergency pressure-tight cover for damaged, leaking core
module docking ports.
4. Provide capability to maintain berthing ports and mechanisms
on core module in orbit.
5. Provide backup means for release of berthing ports.
6. The capability shall be provided for the separation of unmanned
docked vehicles from space station in the event of an uncontroll-
able emergency on the vehicle which poses a hazard to the space
station.
7. Provisions shall be made for the emergency sealing of docking
ports in the event of unplanned leakage.
8. Two independent means shall be provided at each docking port
for permitting personnel transfer.
9. Design provisions shall be maintained within the docking sub-
system which will ensure the ability to dock and perform the
initial manning operation using the safety criteria for credible
combinations of accidents and/or component malfunctions.
10. Docking shall be possible without utilizing shuttle manipulators.
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11. Contingency operational procedures and capability shall be
established for on-board repair of the clocking utility inter-
face malfunctions and/or redock at an alternate port pending
completion of transfer of critical space station consumables
from the cargo module.
12. Docking port hatches shall be operable from either side.
Q. Berthing ports shall provide utility interfaces within the press-
urized volume. The criteria for the utility interfaces is as
follows:
1. Hazardous fluid and gas lines shall be barriered or physically
separated from power wires and each other (GC^  lines shall
be considered hazardous in interface areas).
2. GH2 and G02 lines shall be barriered or separated by a minimum
of 45 degrees.
3. Redundant fluid and gas lines shall be separated by a minimum
of 45 degrees.
4. As a goal, redundant connectors shall be separated a minimum
of 45 degrees (a credible accident to, or a credible failure
of an interface function or adjacent funciton shall not cause
the loss of the redundantly provided function due to proximity
of connectors).
5. Connectors that contain signal wires shall be separated from
connectors that contain power wires by a minimum of 90 degrees.
R. All berthing ports will be provided with environmental shield covers
with the exception of the following:
- Power module +X port
- Core module +X and -X ports and +Z and -Z ports
- Station module -X ports
All covers shall be capable of being opened and closed from within
the space station and by EVA.
S. Provide multiple "grab" locations for the shuttle manipulator on each
module during each stage of buildup and operations.
T. Structures shall provide facilities for containment of all materials
requiring return via the logistics vehicle to prevent contamination
of the environment and reduce the hazard of potential fire and toxic
conditions.
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U. Provisions shall be made for the protection and survival of the
full complement of personnel at an emergency level during solar
• storm activity consistent with the radiation allowables (Table
3.2.2.7-1) and with the specified radiation environment model
and duration for solar storms in the orbits.
V. Environmental Shield Requirements
1. Environmental shield shall provide protection for a probability
of 0.9 of no micrometeroid penetration of space station modules
for ten years.
2. Structures shall provide shielding to limit the crew radiation
dosage to limits specified.
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3.2.2.2 Environmental Control/Life Support Subsystem
A. Environmental Control Life Support Subsystem - The subsystem main-
tains emergency reactant storage for the electrical power and
reaction control subsystems. In addition, special life support
capabilities are provided for emergency conditions.
B. Provisions shall be made for detecting, containing (i.e., con-
fining) and controlling (i.e., restoring to a safe condition)
emergencies such as fires, toxic contamination, and depressuri-
zation (Table 3.2.2.2-1. •
Table 3.2.2.2-1. Emergency Detection'
Assembly/Subass emb ly
Special Life Support
Fire control
Fire extinguisher pkg
Fire detector
Explosion detector
IVA support
IVA connects
EVA/PLSS support
(02, H20)
LiOH canisters
Emergency CC>2 removal
LiOH assembly
LiOH storage
• -Quantity /Location
SM 1
2
1
1
SM 2
2
1
1
1
1
1
SM 3
2
1
1
1
1
1
SM 4
2
1
1
Core
1
1
1 '
2
Power
1
Cargo
1
X
C. A separate 02 storage supply shall be provided for emergency use and
for supply portable life support equipment.
EPS emergency supply (02/H2) - 164 Ib 02, 20.6 Ib H? .
Repressurization (02/N2) - One emergency repressurization of
one-half the core module plus two station modules to a pressure
of 10.0 psia. The pressure shall be allowed to equalize, then
build up gradually to 14.7 psia from normal atmospheric sup-
plies (11,200 cubic feet).
Oxygen system cleanliness requirements shall be established for
the manufacture, installation or maintenance operations. In
addition, only materials which'are compatible with 100 percent
0 shall be used.
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D. While a station module is in the shuttle bay during ground
operations and during ascent to orbit, the ability to detect
a hazardous atmosphere (Table 3.2.2.2-2) and to provide cor-
rection action must be provided prior to suited entry.
E. The cargo module system shall provide alarms and displays to
alert the crew to the presence of a dangerous or potentially
dangerous situation. The nature of the displays and informa-
tion to be displayed are TBD.
F. The capability shall be provided to equalize the pressure
between space station and the cargo module prior to opening
the cargo module hatch.
G. A 96-hour margin of consumables, as a minimum, shall be main-
tained onboard within each pressure isolatable volume.
H. The capability shall be provided to verify the safe environment
and the safe operational status of activated subsystems within
the orbiting vehicle (any module) prior to personnel entry
initially, and prior to reentry following temporary evacuation.
I. The atmospheric circulation in each volume shall be confined,
for normal operations, to that volume, so as to prevent the
rapid transfer of airborne contaminants in an emergency to
other volumes.
J. The internal and external airlocks shall be capable of repress-
urization from a vacuum condition with a breathable atmosphere
within 30 seconds of being sealed, with an adjacent volume
unpressurized.
K. Contaminant control - The MSS atmosphere trace contaminants
shall be monitored and controlled to 0.1 of the threshold limit
value per constituent. Trace contaminants which may be encount-
ered and their maximal acceptable concentration for continuous
exposure shall be as specified in documentation of threshold
limit values. (See revised edition, American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists.) Process flow rates con-
taminant removal subassembly shall be sized by the following
contaminants:
Charcoal - Monomethyl hydrazine
Catalytic oxidizer - Formaldehyde
Ammonia sorbent - Ammonia
Acid gas sorbent - Hydrogen fluoride
The concentration of bacteria in the atmosphere within the
pressurized compartments containing crew quarters, process
laboratories, or experimental facilities shall be monitored
and controlled. RAM is not included.
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The atmosphere constituents, including harmful airborne trace
contaminants and odors will be monitored and controlled in
each separate pressure isolatable volume.
L. The capability shall be provided for providing a habitable
shirtsleeve atmosphere, humidity control, temperature con-
trol, fluid and food supplies, hygiene and waste management -
requirements, for the whole crew for a minimum period of 96
hours:
1. With any one pressurizable volume deactivated, isolated
and vacated due to an accident
-- 2. With any credible combination of a subsystem deactivated
as a result of an accident and a portion of a redundant
or backup subsystem inactive for maintenance.
M. Design and operational provisions within all the ECLSS sub-
assemblies, such as those indicated below for CC>2 malfunction,
shall be made xvhich satisfy the safety criteria for credible
accident and equipment malfunctions established in the opera-
bility portion of the general requirements section of this
specification.
N. Atmospheric Storage and Supply
1. Storage bottles, 62 and N£ surge tanks, lines and connec-
tions shall have as a minimum a design burst pressure
factor of safety of 2.00 and a requirement for hydro-
statically proof pressure testing of 150 percent of the
design operating pressure.
2. High pressure (^ and N£ bottles and their installation shall
include the following design requirements:
a. Provide a means for preventing shrapnel from causing
loss of and/or injury of personnel due to a bottle
rupture.
b. Provide a means of preventing or reducing the possible
injurious effect of a pressure wave from exploding 02
or air storage bottle.
c. Provide a means of preventing loss of space station
pressure due to damage from an explosive rupture of
an 62 and/or air storage bottle.
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0. C02 Management
1. Contingency operational procedures and design capability
shall be provided to safely handle a C02 removal malfunc-
tion as follows:
a. Automatic check of C02 level at two-hour intervals
b. Provide automatic alarm and warning when C02 level
reaches a distracting discomfort level of 16 mm Hg
partial pressure.
c. Initiate troubleshooting and repair when normal oper-
ating C02 level increases at a rate indicating a CC>2
removal malfunction.
2. Design capability for monitoring the level of H£ and CH4
within the space station due to inadvertent leakage shall
be provided together with procedures for troubleshooting
and restoring the system to a safe condition prior to the
development of combustible mixtures.
3. Design capability shall be provided to utilize the emergency
02 supply and provide automatic crew caution and warning
when a loss of.the 1^0 electrolysis unit is detected by an
excessive drop in 62 partial pressure.
4. Contingency operational procedures shall be established for
troubleshooting and restoring a malfunctioning 1^0 electroly-
sis subassembly in sufficient time to preclude calling for
emergency resupply and/or rescue.
P. Atmospheric Control
1. Contingency procedures and a design capability shall be
established to sense the excessive flow of GN2 and shut-
off of the source until maintenance can be performed to
correct the malfunction.
2. A redundant 02 partial pressure monitoring system shall be
used in each space station volume to control the required
flow of 02 and N2 gases. Trend data shall be recorded by
the information subsystem (ISS) and caution and warning to
the crew provided when a critical trend is predicted.
Automatic recalibration of the monitoring system will be
initiated when the redundant monitoring system shows a
difference in excess of TBD psi.
3. Operational procedures and design capability shall be pro-
vided which prevent an excessive increase in space station
temperature in accordance with the safety requirements speci-
fied in the operability portion of the general requirements
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section of this specification. An analysis shall be
developed which evaluates temperature rise associated
with the interrelationship of credible accident and/or
component malfunctions and the thermal loading during
an emergency operation.
4. Requirements for information subsystem shall be established
to automatically monitor and provide trend indications of
the critical trace contaminants, giving crew caution and
warning when trend predictions appear hazardous to person-
nel health and/or experiments.
5. Operational procedures to troubleshoot and restore the space
station trace contaminate to acceptable levels shall be pro-
vided.
6. Criteria and process controls for the elimination and pre-
vention of all toxic materials from entering the space
station during design, manufacturing and resupply shall be
established.
7. Checklists for each subsystem which indicate the equipment
that may be adversely affected by credible contaminates
shall be provided and corrective action plans for their
reduction or control shall be established.
8. Operational procedures shall be established for periodic
replacement of debris filters and contingency replacement
when excess dust accumulates in the space station.
Active Thermal Control
1. Operational procedures to reduce heat generated by elec-
trical equipment on a priority basis shall be developed
(that is, establish a method of sequential shutdown of
nonessential electrical equipment when space station temp-
erature increase indicates a possible malfunction of the
active thermal control subsystem). A method of trouble-
shooting isolating and restoring of the subsystem within a
safe time span shall be provided including the requirement
for an emergency resupply or rescue within 96 hours of
potentially catastrophic effect.
2. The installation of fluorocarbon (F/C) coolant loop plumb-
ing and connectors which are located within the space
station volumes shall be placed in separate leak-tight
containers which have automatic leak detectors, and ISS
caution and warning indication of leakage provided. A
procedure for troubleshooting, isolating and repair of
the malfunction shall also be developed.
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3. Design and operational procedure for monitoring the space
station water coolant loop and F/C coolant loop for leak-
age in either direction shall be provided together with
provision for the isolation and replacement of the sus-
pected intercooler malfunctioning unit.
R. Water Management
1. Operational procedures and capabilities for restoration of
the potable water reclamation unit while the emergency H20
supply is being used shall be established including a
requirement for resupply and/or rescue when two days of
emergency 1^0 remains and repair has not been achieved as
well as provisions for rationing of the remaining potable
water to the crew.
2. Design requirements for the use of redundant contamination
detectors within the potable water supply shall be estab-
lished which will provide automatic warning of an increase
in a dangerous contaminate. Operational procedures for
troubleshooting and restoring of the subsystem prior to a
need for an emergency and for resupply shall also be
developed.
S. Food Management
1. Capability to monitor food preparation ovens for possible
radiation leakage shall be provided including caution and
warning to crew members in the vicinity of the oven.
3.2.2.3 Electrical Power Subsystem
A. Electrical Power Subsystem - The electrical power subsystem shall
store, generate, regulate, control, and condition electrical power
for backup and emergency contingencies (except for emergency fuel
cell reactants which are stored by the ECLSS).
B. Provide electrical power (at the load buses) capable of sustaining
the following loads (watts).
Table 3.2.2.3-1. Emergency Electrical Loads
Initial Station
Emergency
24 Hour
Average
1,500
14 Hour Day
Orbit
Light
Period
1,500
Orbit
Dark
Period
1,500
10 Hour Night
Orbit
Light
Period
1,500
Orbit
Dark
Period
1,500
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C. Power requirements for recreation/crew care/exercise:
Worst days - emergency power approximately 112.8 watts avg/24 hr
- X-ray
- Sterilizer
- Medical light
- Electrocardiogram
D. During emergency operations lighting will be limited to 40 watts.
E. Cable runs shall be suitably enclosed or otherwise protected to
minimize hazards to the crew and provide maximum mechanical pro-
•tection for the conductors.
F. Bus isolation shall be such that failure of one bus will not cause
failure of another bus.
G. The capability shall be provided to supply power to perform
emergency operations for a minimum of 96 hours with one pressure
volume, inactivated,isolated and vacated due to an accident.
H. The capability shall be provided for the detection of time-critical
malfunctions of the EPS or overloads on the EPS, and the automatic
switching to a safe mode of operation.
I. Design requirements shall be established for the use of non-sparking
and/or non-spark propagating electrical equipment and connectors in
all areas where combustible mixtures may collect.
J. Electrical equipment used within the space station where condensa-
tion may collect as a result of an ECLSS humidity control malfunc-
tion shall be designed to function with an environmental condition
with 100 percent humidity for a period of 96 hours maximum duration.
K. In the case of a failure of part of the primary power source where
the normal load cannot be sustained, the remaining portion of the
primary source shall automatically assume the backup load require-
ments. In case of failure of both the primary and backup power
source where the backup load cannot be sustained, the separate
emergency power source shall automatically assume the emergency
load requirements.
L. EPS together with ISS shall provide the necessary electrical distri-
bution and hardware for control of the EPS from two separate and
redundant control centers, one center in each pressure isolatable
volume.
M. EPS shall be designed for fail-safe operation and where possible
will result in only gradual degradation and loss of function follow-
ing failures.
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N. All circuits shall be provided with circuit protection devices.
Circuit protection devices for circuits required for emergency
operations will be re-setable from the control centers.
0. The emergency distribution can be the same or integrated within
the primary distribution (normal redundant requirements); however,
the critical life support functions shall be capable of being elec-
trically isolated frcm the general distribution through automatic
load shedding of noncritical functions.
P. Electrical distribution panels shall be adequately enclosed or
otherwise protected to minimize hazards to the crew and provide
maximum mechanical protection for the electrical subsystem and
components.
3.2.2.4 Guidance and Control Subsystem
A. Loss of pressurization in a volume may be caused by accidental
penetration of an outside wall with the maximum dimensions of the
hole being two inches. The station shall be able to stabilize for
docking/berthing within TBD hours.
B. Operational procedures and/or design provisions for the critical
guidance and control functions shall be established which will
ensure the ability to dock the shuttle with the station, both dur-
ing the premanning and manned phases.
C. Contingency operational procedures and crew training shall be pro-
vided to allow manual computation of guidance parameters for orbit
maintenance of the space station in the event of a computer malfunc-
tion.
D. Emergency flight control of space station shall be provided from
local manual control device in each pressure volume in core module.
3.2.2.5 Reaction Control Subsystem
A. Safety factor to be applied to pressurized vessels in normally
habitable areas shall be at least 4 and in other areas, 2.
B. Provide RCS attitude control for docking capability
Unmanned Operations
0 - Failures, use Set 1 and Set 2
1 - Failure (any engine), use either/or Set 1, Set 2
2 - Failures (Set 1 and 2) any engine
3 - Failures, yaw engine, no yaw
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Manned Operations
Same as unmanned operations; after thrustor failure, quad
can be replaced. Docking function is not time critical.
C. The RCS shall be capable of operation at each failure level as shown
below:
Failures . Requirement Interpretation
0 Provide all functions
Size accumulators for 12-hour impulse requirement
with no reserve allowance
1 Provide all functions
Orbit makeup can be delayed until repair completed
If repair time greater than 5 days, utilize EPS and
ECLSS capability for orbit makeup
2 Degrade operations
CMC.desaturation once/orbit
Orbit makeup delayed until repair completed
Utilize EPS and ECLSS capability as required
3 Provide docking capability
Utilize EPS and ECLSS capability as required
D. Tanks used as gas accumulators in inhabited areas shall be designed
to a factor of safety of 4.0 as a minimum. Tank supports shall be
designed to restrain the tank under propulsive effects of rapidly
escaping gas.
3.2.2.6 Information Subsystem
A. Supervisory Programs - These programs shall provide the processing
and control necessary to coordinate and schedule the work of the
applications programs and carry out service functions for them. The
supervisory programs shall handle input/output and the queueing of
messages and data. They shall coordinate and optimize machine loads
under various conditions and shall service interrupts and deal with
errors or emergency conditions.
B. ISS shall provide the following:
Alarm override of paging system
Local monitor alarm - one in each module
Emergency G&C control
On-board checkout - verify emergency capability
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C. The capability shall be provided to detect malfunctions in the oper-
ations of the subsystems and experiments using data provided by
subsystems and experiments, trace the malfunction to the failed
inflight replaceable unit, and display the information necessary for
corrective action.
D. For those malfunctions and/or hazards which may result in time-
critical emergencies, provisions shall be made for the automatic
switching to a safe mode of operation, and for caution and warning
to personnel.
E. Caution and warning information relating to time-critical emergencies
shall be provided by at least two separate means, not using any com-
mon hardware.
F. No single failure nor equipment down for maintenance shall prevent
the communications of data and information necessary to handle a
space station emergency situation.
G. Safety monitor during buildup:
In cargo bay
Hardware measurements for all modules '
Quiescent operations - unmanned
Transient subsystem status once daily for 1 sec
transmission time
Verify core module safety
Crew ingress
Pressurize adapter
Equalize,pressure between shuttle and adapter
Open shuttle/adapter hatch
Correct CM/shuttle,interface lines
Verify CM temperature and pressure
Equalize pressure between adapter and CM
Open adapter (CM hatch)
Crew CM ingress (suited)
. Verify shuttle/adapter/CM interface
Verify CM integrity
Verify station safety
H. The capability shall be provided to monitor the status of EVA
personnel by two independent means. These data shall be available
at the control centers.
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I. The capability shall be provided to determine the existence of
emergencies such as fires, toxic contamination, depressurization,
structural damage, etc., using data provided by other subsystems
and experiments. Appropriate caution and warning information
shall be provided to affected crew members for such situations,
informing them of the type and location of the emergency, and of
the necessary corrective action (Table 3.2.2.2-1).
J. A backup control center shall be provided in a different pressure
volume from the primary control center. It shall have the capability,
at the minimum, (1) to provide the command and control functions to
operate the active subsystems and experiments in the event of loss
of access to the volume containing the primary control center due to
an accident, and (2) to provide sufficient monitoring, checkout,
command and control functions of the subsystems and experiments in
the affected volume to ensure safety, prevent further damage to equip-
ment, and determine repair, IVA maintenance and resupply requirements
to restore shirtsleeve access to the affected volume.
K. The space station shall be provided with an override capability to
exercise flight control over the shuttle from stationkeeping to hard
dock. The SS control centers shall be capable of monitoring and con-
trolling MSS/shuttle closing ranges, rates, and attitudes to ensure
structural integrity and crew safety during terminal rendezvous and
docking operations.
3.2.2.7 Crew and Habitability Subsystem
A. Crew Habitability Subsystem - The subsystem provides emergency
oxygen masks and radiation monitoring devices for the crew.
B. The atmosphere constituents, including harmful airborne trace contam-
inants shall be monitored and controlled in each pressurized compart-
ment of the space station.
C. In the event of space station pressure hull damage resulting in
pressure decay in a pressure volume, the duration of acceptable crew
performance shall be considered to be that period of time until a
partial pressure of oxygen of 1.9 psi is reached.
D. 02 emergency flow (22 Ib/man-hr for 30 minutes) shall be required
for IVA support.
E. Microbiologically and bacteriologically contaminated waste material
shall be disinfected as close as possible to its source prior to
storage, processing or disposal; e.g., small animal waste and other
bioscience particulate matter.
F. Special protective garments and equipment shall be provided for
personnel working in a toxic environment or near potentially toxic
station elements.
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G. Deployment and initiation of operations considered hazardous shall be
checked out from a safe location before exposing-crewmen to the
potential hazards.
H. Emergency personnel equipment shall be provided and located in each
module and shall consist of:
1. Three emergency oxygen full-face masks with integral
portable oxygen bottles of five-minute capacity
2. Two.liquid-cooled garments (LCG), pressure garment
assemblies (PGA), and portable life support systems
.(PLSS) - .. • .
3. IVA umbilical connections and hoses sufficient to reach
all interior volumes for repair
I. Personal radiation dosimeters shall be provided for each crewman.
They shall be worn at all times (in pockets on crew garments), and
shall be capable of measuring accumulated radiation dosage.
J. Emergency general crew equipment shall consist of portable lights
and a medical accessories (first aid) kit. They shall satisfy the
following performance requirements.
1. Total of one portable light per module shall be provided
for emergency maintenance or inspection in the event of
power--failure-.--Each-portable, light shall be capable of pro-
viding floodlight-type direct illumination of 100 foot candles
<: at a distance of 10 feet, and not less than 50 foot candles at
this same distance after three hours of continuous operation.
Each portable light shall have a carrying handle and actuation
device compatible for use with a gloved hand (suited/pressur-
ized operations). Capability to recharge portable light
batteries shall be provided.
2. Medical accessories kit - A medical accessories (first aid)
kit shall be provided in each module except in the module
containing the medical treatment area. This kit shall be
capable of providing for medical emergencies. This kit shall
include such items as oral drugs, injectable drugs, dressings,
bandages, and topical agents.
K. In addition to the personal radiation dosimeters provided as per-
sonal equipment and worn by the crewmen, suitable devices shall
be provided at selected locations within each module to measure
ambient radiation levels as well as cumulative radiation dosage.
L. Emergency biomedical equipment will be provided and located in each
habitable module and will be readily accessible to the crew.
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M. The following equipment shall be provided for medical and dental
care of the crew:
Lower body negative pressure devices
Mass measurement device
Mobile X-ray unit
Examination tables (details - to be determined)
Surgical instruments (details - to be determined)
Sterilizer
Stowage cabinets
Miscellaneous portable diagnostic equipment (details - TBD)
N. Food Management - A backup galley shall provide food service in the
event of loss of the primary galley for six men up to 30 days. The
backup galley shall contain, as a minimum:
Dried food
Reconstitution unit
Thermodried food
Skylab heating trays
0. Provisions shall be made for emergency medical treatment of sick or
injured personnel for a minimum period of 96 hours. All potential
conditions and injuries consistent with the age, physical and mental
condition, and planned stay time of the on-board personnel shall be
considered.
P. Provisions shall be made for the restraint of irrational personnel.
Q. Provisions for suited IVAj EVA, and entry into hazardous areas shall
, be based on the operation being conducted by at least two men. Pro-
visions shall be made for the rescue of one man by the other in an
emergency.
R. Provisions shall be made for emergency treatment of injured personnel
following an accident which renders the pressurizable volume contain-
ing the primary medical facilities unavailable.
S. Pressure suits, backpacks and umbilicals, and related support equip-
ment shall be provided in readily available locations so that two
suits may be reached and donned from any location in the space station,
with any one pressurizable volume inaccessible.due to an accident.
T. Emergency suits required in the space station core module shall be
in readily accessible locations within each pressure isolatable
volume.
U. The capability shall be provided on the space station for the detec-
tion of malfunctions and/or hazards, tracing to the failed replaceable
unit, and the display of information to the crew necessary for correct-
ive action.
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V. The cargo module system shall provide emergency lighting to
support crew activities.
W. Provisions shall be made for the protection and survival of the
whole crew during solar storm activities as defined by the design
mission radiation model. The radiation dosage limitations defined
in Table 3.2.2.7-1 shall apply.
X. Irradiation diagnostic devices will be shielded such that radiation
protection is afforded the operator and inflight personnel other
than the patient. Shielding shall be of such design that flight
crew in the vicinity of operating irradiation devices will not accum-
ulate a radiation dose, including the natural radiation, great enough
to exceed the radiation limits in Table 3.2.2.7-1.
Table 3.2.2.7-1. Allowable Radiation Limits
Organ
Skin
Eye
Mat row
Limit Dose (REM)
Depth
(0. 1 mm)
(3.0 mm)
(5. 0 mm)
Daily*
0.6
0.3
0.2
30-Day
75
37
25
Quarterly**
105
52
35
* One year average
Yearly
225
112
75
Career
1200
600
400
** May be allowed for two consecutive quarters with six months
restriction from further exposure to maintain yearly limit
3.2.3 Shuttle Interfaces
A. The space shuttle shall be capable of supporting an on-call emergency
capability of MSS rendezvous and berthing within 48 hours after noti-
fication.
B. Provide backup means for returning module to shuttle cargo bay in the
event of shuttle, manipulator failure.
C. Provide backup release on shuttle manipulator.
D. Provide independent emergency means for folding manipulator cut of
way following failure.
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4.0 TRADE STUDIES
System safety considerations were strong drivers for trade studies and
special studies performed for the MSS. Candidate functions, operations and
configurations were reviewed for compliance with the safety ground rules,
constraints, and criteria. Hazards were identified and alternatives were
evaluated for mission performance including all feasible safety features
and a qualitative comparison of residual hazards. The selected configuration
was reviewed for hazard elimination according to the hazard reduction pre-
cedence sequence. These special studies resulted in some new requirements
which are listed in Section 3.0 of this report and in the Preliminary Per-
 :
formance Specification, DRL 66.
While all safety criteria proved to be influential in design selection,
several selected criteria had a notable effect on the assembled MSS configura-
tion. The requirement for multiple, isolatable volumes drove the distribution
of subsystem and emergency capabilities. Where a critical function is lost,
crew survival provisions must be available for 96 hours to permit rescue by
the shuttle. The program requirement for response is 48 hours, which leaves
48 hours for shuttle or station contingency. Adequate subsystem redundancy
must be distributed throughout the isolatable volumes to meet critical funct-
ion failure tolerance criteria. The requirement for two entry/egress paths
;drove the internal module configuration to a longitudinal .floor with separate
paths on either side and to flexports between habitable modules. Flexports
are fixed tunnels connecting station modules (in addition to the normal path
through the core module) and providing emergency, shirtsleeve passage. Haz-
ard detection means were required for every alternative,
A summary of safety considerations applied to configuration and opera-
tions trades is contained in Table 4.0-1.
Special safety studies have run the gamut from functional considera-
tions at the system level to the amount of subsystem redundancy required for
emergency back-up.
The special studies summarized in this section are only a portion of
those performed but represent the most significant for the MSS. Studies
at the system level are included that produced an MSS design that was safe
to operate, for example:
1, Multiple volumes with capability to maintain life support and
(reduced) station operation following loss of any given volume
(or module).
2. More than one shirtsleeve escape route from any normally inhabited
module to another habitable module (actually to the remainder of
the station.) Normal egress through end hatch into core module —
alternate egress through flexport to adjacent station module.
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3. Dual IVA paths available/Dual EVA paths available.
4. Consistent failure and accident tolerance criteria applied to
all subsystems supplying critical functions; e.g., fail operate,
fail reduced, fail safe until rescue.
5. High energy pressure vessels located outside of normally inhabited
modules or pressure vessels/accumulators inhabited modules designed
to ]>4.0 safety factor.
6. Double containment of all hazardous fluids (tanks, lines and
fittings).
7. Restraint/pressure equalizing requirement for all hatches with
A P.
Additional safety analyses are presented which illustrate the depth
of detail required to support the system choices.
4.1 MULTIPLE VOLUMES
If an accident occurs which could result in depressurization, atmos-
pheric contamination, or loss of some critical function, the crew must be
able to survive safely in a separate pressurized area until the affected
volume is restored to a habitable condition or until they are rescued by a
shuttle. As many as 48 to 96 hours may be required to reach the station and
this set the minimum time for crew survival onboard the station. These con-
siderations led to the first of the system safety criteria in Table 4.0-1
which required the station to be divided into separate pressure-isolatable
volumes.
The design solution consists of arranging the habitable modules into
pressure-isolatable volumes of approximately equal capabilities, as shown
in Figure 4.1-1. Each of the two volumes includes half of the core module,
two station modules with crew support provisions, and provisions for attach-
ing cargo modules and research application modules (RAM's). Each of the two
volumes contains complete environmental control, thermal control and informa-
tion subsystems, a control center, docking/berthing capability, and emergency
supplies. Each volume can support the crew of six indefinitely (subject to
adequate consumables) independently of the other volume. Primary electrical
power is supplied to both volumes from a common power module and is available
to both volumes even if one has been evacuated.
One of the more credible reasons for evacuating one volume is that the
atmosphere has become contaminated, possibly with smoke from a fire. The
air circulation systems in the two volumes are, therefore, kept separate so
that contaminants from one volume will not be introduced into the other
volume. It was possible to design the station so that only the affected
module could be isolated following an accident. However, this would require,
for example, that each environmental control subsystem be able to supply other
modules in the volume, and that many of the air ducts would have to be capable
of operating in a vacuum (in the event of depressurization of that area). The
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valving system would also be considerably more complex. Because of these
reasons, the simpler approach with each environmental control subsystem
servicing its own volume was adopted. This design allowed for individual
module isolation in many emergency situations. Loss of atmospheric and
thermal control, however, would allow for only limited shirtsleeve operations
in that volume.
,VOL I
VOL II
CARGO
MODULE
Figure A.1-1. Modular Space Station - Dual Volumes
4.2 DUAL SHIRTSLEEVE EGRESS
Because of the key influence of the system safety criterion for dual
entry and egress on the configurational arrangement of the space station
and of each module, a special evaluation was made of the criterion and of
the means for implementing it.
System safety goals require that no credible combination of malfunctions
and accidents result in serious injury to personnel or to crew abandonment of
the station. Of the 17 credible accidents defined, three produce a situation
which may require evacuation of a module, and at the same time may preclude
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access to any one exit. These credible accidents .are fire, explosion, and
accident in a hatch (i.e., opening between modules). For example, flames,
fumes, or heat from fire close to an opening may prevent personnel from,
exiting from the affected module, and the men may suffocate if another exit
route were not available to an area with an.independently controlled atmos-
phere. Similarly, an explosion could result in a'fire near an opening, and
an accident in an opening may injure or otherwise endanger personnel but
prevent their exit or rescue by other personnel.
To satisfy the system safety goal, it was: necessary to provide for two
or more ways in and out of each area, located and separated from each other
so that a single accident would not prevent access to both of them. This
therefore led to the criterion for two or more entry/egress paths (see'Table
4.0-1). •
The separation of the two paths by airtight partitions allowed a crew-
man to get past a fire or a source of fumes to gain access to an exit: if
a module were divided by a floor, as shown in Figure 4.2-1, and a fire
started in Area C, a man stationed at A can still get past the fire to get
to the exit B by going below the floow, as shown by the dotted line, without
having to pass through the fire or fumes. The 10-foot separation is deter-
mined by the judgment that the immediately dangerous area (heat, flames,
debris) in a credible accident would extend over a.distance of about 5 feet.
Two paths in the same open area separated by at least 10 feet should there-
fore provide at least one safe path past the accident area.
MAN
A
FLOOR
\
FIRE \
c \
V
|
'
;EXIT
B
. — — '
t
/
Figure 4.2-1. Dual Egress Path Provided by Floor
in Module
Three alternative barbell/cruciform configuration solutions were con-
sidered for applying this criterion to the space station configuration
(Figure 4.2-2). They are open configurations, in which all modules were
attached at one end only to a common core module, but using 1) auxiliary
emergency secondary passages between modules, called .flexports, to connect
adjacent manned modules at the other end; 2) an emergency volume attached at
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the far end, internally to the module, into which the crew could take refuge
until rescue by the shuttle or until the safe environment was restored in
the affected module; and 3) an emergency volume attached externally at the
far end to the module.
Table 4.2-1 summarizes the evaluation of these alternatives. Additional
design complexity and weight results from each of the three solutions. The
flexport solution required development of the mechanisms and materials to
deploy, dock, and take up some deflections. The emergency volume concepts
required an additional environmental control/life support subsystem (ECLSS)
in each emergency volume which was separate from the ECLSS of the module to
which it was attached, so that it would not be contaminated by fumes from
the affected module.
(A) FLEXPORTS (B) EMERGENCY VOLUME
1. INTERNAL
2—EXTERNAL-
Figure 4.2-2. Alternative Solutions for Dual Egress
The selected solution was the use of flexports between adjacent station
modules in the preferred configuration. Special safety provisions would be
applied to cargo modules and RAM's, which have a low crew occupancy rate.
Such provisions may consist of special procedures to check the status of'
potentially hazardous equipment before entry into the modules (as opposed to
routine entry without special safety checks) ; special fire prevention, detection
and suppression means; the avoidance of potentially hazardous equipment near
the exit. Similar special safety provisions should be applied during buildup
of the station when one or more manned modules do not have an adjacent module
for connection by a flexport.
The flexports consist, functionally, of a tubular connection between
two adjacent modules which are capable of allowing rapid shirtsleeve transfer
of personnel between the modules. They are of a diameter (3 feet or more)
to allow IVA suited men to return to a depressurized or contaminated module
for maintenance and repair. The flexports are stowed during launch of the
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Table 4.2-1. Evaluation of Alternative Solutions
for Dual Egress
Flexports
(Secondary Passages)
Emergency Volume
Internal
Emergency Volume
External .
1. Operational restrictions
in buildup
2. Increased leakage
3. Additional mechanical
devices
1. Added ECLSS
2. Additional pressure
bulkhead and structure
3. Loss of useful volume
1. Added ECLSS
2. Additional mechanical
device
modules within the module moldline and are deployed and joined to the
adjacent module after hard docking of the two modules to the core module.
They can be disconnected and retracted for returning modules to earth.
While connected, the flexports must have sufficient flexibility to accept
normal relative motions of the connected modules due to structural flexibi-
lity, and manufacturing and assembly tolerances, Figures 4.2-2 and 4.2-3.
The purpose of the flexports is to provide an emergency exit from a
module into another module in the event of an emergency which either (a)
prevents exit through the normal berthing port hatch into the core module,
or (b) makes it safer to exit through the flexport.
Functional requirements for the flexport hatches to achieve this are:
a) Reasonably rapid opening of hatches (if closed).
b) Shirtsleeve atmosphere in flexport at all times spacecraft is
manned and flexport operational.
c) Reasonably rapid shutting of hatches. This is desirable for
hatches between modules in one volume, but is a requirement
between volumes (see "d").
d) All hatches between volumes to be shut, and confirmed to be
shut, after evacuation of a volume, with minimum crew actions.
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STOWED
INSTALLATIONS EXTEND TUNNEL
flo I 6
V2
FLEXPORT
PRESSURIZE
OPEN HATCHES
CpToj
V, Vj
Figure 4.2-3. Flexports Between Modules
e) Minimum interchange of atmospheres between volumes in normal mode
(to avoid cross-contamination, which, if carried to extremes,
could preclude habitation of either pressure volume).
Table 4.2-2, below evaluates the safety advantages/disadvantages of
normally keeping hatches open or closed against each functional requirement.
Check marks imply advantages, and crosses disadvantages.
Table 4.2-2. Flexport Hatch Position Comparison
Functional Requirement Open Closed
a) Rapid opening
b) Shirtsleeve atmosphere
c) Rapid shutting
d) All hatches shut, & confirmed
shut
e) Minimum interchange of atmos-
phere - ' ' '' ' -
^Automatic.
^Automatic.
X Increases the
of hatches to be
closed including the
core module hatch.
X Increases the
of hatches to be
closed including the
core module hatch.
XMaximum.
X Crew action.
X Requires valving.
the hatches
that are used and
the core module
hatch need to be
closed.
numberjixOnly the hatches
that are used and
the core module
hatch need to be
closed.
ixMinimum.
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Bearing in mind that the flexports only have to be used in case of an
emergency, and even then the normal means for p.xic will be into the core
module; and also that no identified credible accident leads to an extremely
time critical situation (i.e., requiring escape in'seconds rather than
minutes), primary importance is given to the factors (b),' (d) and (e) in
Table 4.2-2.
The recommendation is therefore made that flexport hatches normally be
kept shut. To support this decision, the following additional requirements
should be implemented.
a) The flexport hatches shall be designed for rapid, single action
opening, and rapid, single action closing from both sides.
b) The flexport shall be designed so that its atmosphere is normally
maintained at the same pressure as the station,.and is suitable
for rapid shirtsleeve passage of personnel. Following use in an
emergency, the pressurization need not be maintained, but means
for re-establishing a suitable pressure shall be provided.
c) Means shall be provided for shutting off any airflow across the
hatches, e.g., for pressure equalization, from either side of
each hatch. Remote shut-off of all hatches between pressure
isolatable volumes shall be provided.
d) The open or closed status of each hatch shall be monitored at
the control centers.
e) Operational procedures and/or design provisions shall be made
for the rapid closure of flexport hatches so as to minimize or
prevent cross-contamination of the atmosphere in the two pressure
isolatable volumes.
Another decision, with Phase B impact, is whether the flexport hatches
should open outwards (from the module) or inwards. Because of the immediately
catastrophic consequences of an outward opening hatch accidentally opening
(when a flexport is hot connected to it), the hatches are required to open
inwards, into the modules. .
4.3 DUAL IVA/EVA ROUTES
There are a number of potential emergencies which will require intra-
vehicular or extravehicular activity. The location, size, and number of
IVA/EVA airlocks became an important safety considerations and have been
found to exert some influence in the configuration of the modular space
station. The most obvious use for an airlock is to allow entry into a
depressurized or otherwise uninhabitable pressure volume. An IVA airlock
must therefore be located at the interface of the two pressure volumes.
Since an accident that caused the requirement for IVA also may result in
damage to the airlock, a second means of obtaining access to the affected
volume is required. It is acceptable for this backup means to involve some
EVA activity.
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Similarly, EVA access should be available by at least two independent
routes, located or accessible from each of the two pressure volumes.
As configurational arrangements of the various modules have: been
developed, the location and arrangements for IVA and EVA airlocks have been
integrated into the configuration. Figure 4.3-1 shows one of the potential
modular space station configurations which has been considered. This con-
tains an 1VA/EVA airlock, shown shaded in the figure, between the two central
core modules. This airlock could be used for either IVA or EVA from either
of the two volumes. As a backup IVA mode for use if the central airlock
could not be used, one of the crew quarter modules could be sealed off and
depressurized, and the flexport used to obtain access to the other pressure
volume. Backup EVA capability exists by using the same modules for perform-
ing EVA, and emergency EVA return also exists through one or more experiment
airlocks, as well as through an airlock at the end of the power module, as
shown in the figure. This arrangement exceeded the requirements for two
independent ways of performing IVA and two for EVA.
The airlock must be sized to accommodate two men in a pressure garment
assembly (PGA) with a backpack attached, because all IVA and EVA must be
done using the buddy system. In this way one man can help the other in an
emergency. This requirement resulted in a minimum size for each airlock of
30 square feet of area by 7 feet in height. Hatches must be capable of being
opened from either side (after pressure equalization) and two PGA's must be
located in each of the two pressure volumes.
BACKUP IVA
(USING MODULE AS AHLOCK)
EXPIS AHLOCK
JM£SCENCY EVA «t
Figure 4.3-1. IVA/EVA Airlocks and Routes
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One of the key considerations for IVA or EVA is the need to pre-breath
pure oxygen to avoid the bends. This phenomonen could occur near 7 psi
(from a 14.7 psi condition) and previously employed pressure suits operate
at 3.5 to 5.0 psi with pure oxygen. The pre-breathing requirement could
impose a severe restriction on the speed with which IVA or EVA can be per-
formed, since it may take up to three hours to assure elimination of nitrogen
from the blood stream. IVA and EVA could not, therefore, be a time-critical
response to emergencies. Adequate supplies of pure oxygen would have to be
available at each airlock location, and pre-breathing should be done before
donning PGA's, however, in a 14.7 psi mixed atmosphere. These difficulties
led to the consideration of a higher suit pressure where pre-breathing was
not necessary. The advantages of a normal atmosphere soon outweighed the
disadvantages and the higher suit pressure was selected as contributing to
safety.
4.4 OPERATING MODES AND FAILURE/ACCIDENT TOLERANCE CRITERIA
The purpose of this section is to clarify the existing guidelines and
criteria affecting the design of the MSS with respect to number of failures,
and to describe certain operational modes related to these.
It became apparent that definition of the operational modes or plateaus
of the space station following failures and/or credible accidents was required.
In order to avoid semantics problems with the terminology, the various modes
were described by the terms A, B. C. etc. The definitions of these modes
are given in Table 4.4-1.
Table 4.4-1. Definition of Operational Modes
Operational
Mode Definition
D
All functions being performed within spec.
No failures have occurred requiring maint-
enance .
All critical functions being performed within
spec. Some failures have occurred requiring
maintenance.
All critical functions are being performed,
but some are out of spec, limits.
Crew can survive for 96 hours, but not until
next scheduled Shuttle
or
One more failure can preclude crew survival
for 96 hours.
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In order to determine how much redundancy would be applied during the
preliminary' design of the MSS and to determine the level of this redundancy,
Safety and Reliability criteria were established early in the Phase B Contract,
The criteria, Guidelines and Constraints, and definitions which are
currently applicable to number of features from the NASA Guidelines and
Constraints are listed below.
Capability shall be provided for performing critical functions
at a nominal level with any single component failures, or with
any portion of a subsystem inactive for maintenance.
Capability shall be provided for performing critical functions
at a reduced level with any credible combination of two com-
ponent failures, or with any credible combination, of a portion
of a subsystem inactive for maintenance and failure of a
component in the remaining portion of the subsystem.
Specific applicability to the MSS resulted in the following:
Capability shall be provided for performing critical functions
at a nominal level.
1. With any single component failed, or
2. With any portion of the subsystem inactive for maintenance.
Capability shall be provided for performing critical functions
at a reduced level.
1. With any credible combination of two component failures, or
2. With any credible combination of a portion of the subsystem
inactive for maintenance and a failure of a component in
the remaining portion of the subsystem.
It is important to note that component failures are referred to in the
criteria. These will generally correspond to IFRU failures, except where
IFRU's have been designed so that no single component failure within the
IFRU can cause failure of the critical function of the IFRU. In such a
case, the IFRU failure should be counted as two component failures. In
any event, the term "component"-should not be confused with the definition
of a level 7 item which is defined for purposes of costing in the MSS.
A correct application of the criteria would lead to two assemblies
(each of which can still perform its function with any single component
failed); to a design using one such assembly, with an alternate mode for
performing the function and an emergency means fair crew survival; or to
many other possible combinations.
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Since we are planning for the failure of components (i.e., we are
expecting them to occur), an accident does not by definition, result simply
from component failures. Some unexpected crew action, design, manufacturing
or other defects, actions by the shuttle or other vehicles, or unexpected
environments contribute to accidents. The station is required, by this
section, to allow for crew survival following these. It should be noted
that, generally speaking, accidents are situations, and are generally accepted
as credible without having to justify exactly what combinations of events can
lead to each accident. This is contrary to component failures, for which
credible failure modes have to be identified.
The failure criteria apply to any component failures that impact the
performance of critical functions and may be satisfied by providing redundancy
within a subsystem or by alternate operating modes. The prime objective is
to maintain critical functions to avoid loss of personnel during manned opera-
tions and continuation of the Space Station mission during buildup and manned
operations. Tables 4.4-2 and 4.4-3 apply the general criteria to the MSS.
Table 4.4-2. Allowable Failure Criteria During Station
Buildup - Premanning
Following:
1 component failure
2 component failures
Criteria Definition
The Station shall still be capable of being
manned (shirtsleeve or IVA) for performance
of maintenance and Station assembly tasks.
This capability shall continue until arrival
of the next scheduled Shuttle.
The Station shall still be capable of being
manned (shirtsleeve or IVA) for at least 96
hours to accommodate an emergency Shuttle
flight to perform maintenance.
Table 4.4-3. Allowable Failure Criteria During Manned
Station Operations
Following;
1 component failure
or
any portion of a subsystem
inactive for maintenance.
Criteria Definition
The Station shall still be capable of opera-
ting with all critical functions performed
within specified values. This condition
shall continue until maintenance can be
performed.
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Table 4.4-3.. Allowable Failure Criteria During Manned
Station Operations (Cont)
Following:
Any credible combination of
2 component failures.
or
1 component failure with
any portion of a subsystem
inactive for maintenance.
or
Any credible accident
(e.g., loss of any pressure
isolatable volume) ..
Any credible combination of
3 component failures.
or i
Component failures and :
portions of a subsystem
inactive for maintenance.
or
Any credible accident
(e.g., loss of any pressure
isolatable volume) and any
~si"ngle~~cb~mp~on"en't~f-a±iu-re-;
Criteria Definition
The Station shall still be capable of
operating with some .critical functions-
performed at a reduced level,.but not
below the level necessary .for crew sur-
vival. This condition shall continue
until maintenance can be performed, but
no more than 30 days or until arrival
of the next scheduled Shuttle.
The Station shall still be capable of
crew survival for at least 96 hours to
permit restoration of operations or
rescue of the crew by emergency Shuttle,
An interpretation of the design criteria of Table 4.4-3, combined with
the operational mode definitions of Table 4.4-1, lead to a set of operational
criteria which determine permissible operational modes for the MSS following
different numbers of failures (see Table 4.4-4). It is necessary to distin-
guish in this table between failures in critical functions and failures in
non-critical functions. Suggested terminology for these operational modes
or plateaus is included. Pictorially, the failure criteria for the manned
Table 4.4-4. Operational Criteria
Operational Mode
A - Normal
B - Nominal
C - Degraded
D - Emergency
Allowable Number of Component Failures
to Reach Operational Mode
Station Operation
(Manned)
0
1
2
3
Build-Up
(Unmanned)
0
—
1
2
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station operation are summarized in Figure 4.4-1. Requirements for redundant
equipment were determined using the logic diagram of Figure 4.4-2.
A properly designed MSS would satisfy the failure criteria of Table
4.4-3 and the operational criteria of Table 4.4-4. Ideally, the space
station design will meet these criteria. However, it was recognized that
in practice, certain exceptions have to be made where it is either impossible
or impractical to meet these criteria. These deviations were jointly identi-
fied, by the design groups in conjunction with Safety and Reliability per-
sonnel, and are published in the residual hazards and single point failure
summaries.
PERFORMANCE
REQUIREMENTS NORMAL
-O
NO. OF COMPONENT
FAILURES OR
MAINTENANCE
ACTIONS
Fieure 4.4-1.
-0
LIMITS FOR
C=P.V AND
.STATION
SURVIVAL
i
DEGRADED EI.-==~GE~NCY
JL
EXCEEDING
EMERGENC
LEVELS
CATASTRCPV- C
CRIT
Performance Requirements as Related to
Component Failures
Figure 4.4-2. Logic Diagram for Determining
Redundancy Requirements
-82-
SD 71-224
Space Division
North American Rockwell
4.5 PRESSURE VESSEL CRITERIA
An inevitable hazard on any space station configuration is the storage
of various fluids in pressurized tanks for long periods. Since it was not
possible to eliminate this hazard, steps were taken to minimize its potential
effects and to make provisions in case of an accident.
Three main concerns arose with stored fluids. First, leakage of certain
gases such as hydrogen, methane, or hydrazine could result in fire, explosion,
or toxic effects; second, a large leakage rate inside a pressurized volume
could cause overpressurization, leading to structural failure of the station;
and third, a catastrophic rupture could cause damage to equipment, structural
failure, and loss of life. A number of obvious precautions have been taken
in the space station design. Every attempt has been made to locate hazardous
and toxic fluid storage tanks and high-pressure tanks outside of pressurized
and habitable volumes. Gases such as hydrazine have been avoided whenever
possible because of their high toxicity. And, finally, for those tanks which
must be placed inside the pressurized volume, every attempt was made to reduce
the explosive potential of individual tanks and locate them so that an explo-
sion of one tank would not propagate to adjacent ones.
The gases which are necessary on the station depend on the selection
of atmospheric control, power, and reaction control systems. In all of the
space station designs considered, large quantities of oxygen, hydrogen, and
nitrogen have been required. Various means have been considered for prevent-
ing shrapnel from causing additional damage. These included use of chain
~ltnkr-armor—b-l-as-t—shields^ —the—us-e-o-f—blowout—plugs—o.r.ien.te.d_tow.ards a safe
direction, and the use of nonshattering tank material such as filament-wound
fiberglass.
The explosive content of a stored gas, usually expressed ,in terms of
TNT equivalent, depends primarily on the total energy content which can be
released, and is approximately equal to the total enthalpy of the stored
fluid. For a gas, this is proportional to the mass of the gas, the specific
heat at constant .pressure, and absolute temperature. The pressure at which
a given mass of gas is stored relates to the TNT equivalent as shown in
Figure 4.5-1. Since an explosion of a low-pressure tank could be as catastro-
phic as the explosion of the same mass of gas stored in a high-pressure tank,
no attempt has been made to require storage tanks on board the station to be
at low pressures for explosive reasons. However, damage assessment showed
that an acceptable TNT equivalent for storage within the pressure volume
could be approximately 0.025 pounds or 50 BTU's of energy (approximately
the same as a hand grenade). While every attempt has been made to restrict
on-board tanks to such a size, this became very difficult when the need for
maintenance and replaceability of the tanks was considered.
A potential solution consisted of placing all of the high-pressure and
hazardous gas storage tanks in a special module attached to the station
externally... In this way, the. hazardous gases were isolated away from the
living and operating quarters. The outer hatch could be designed to accept
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•the blast from any credible explosion. The atmospheric pressure in this
module would normally be kept low, but the module could.be fully pressurized
to allow crew access for-maintenance, inspection, and resupply of individual
tanks..
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.Figure 4.5-1. TNT Equivalent of Pressure Vessel
Much attention has been given to .locating redundant tanks in widely
different .locations on the station, so that a catastrophic loss of one set
of tanks would still allow continued operation cf the station, at least
until -a rescue shuttle mission could remedy the situation. Fluids required
for 'use in an emergency only, could be located in a single location, such
.as the special module discussed above, with provisions for supplying the
fluids to either of the two pressurized volumes by appropriate plumbing.
The final design solution satisfied safety requirements by locating
high energy tanks in the power boom and attached cargo module where crew
.exposure would be -minimal. Since hydrogen and oxygen are generated by electro-
lysis during the solar exposure portion of the orbit and used in the fuel
cells during the dark portion, it is necessary to store the gases in accumula-
tors to a maximum .pressure of 300 psi. Practically, these accumulators must
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be located in the inhabited core and station modules together with the EPS,
ECLSS and RCS subsystems. To minimize the hazardous effect of a bursting
pressure vessel the energy content was limited by sizing. A conservative
design safety factor of 4.0 was imposed to keep tank material strain well
within the elastic range since the tanks operate as accumulators with con-
stant pressure cycling over the ten-year life. The core module tanks will
be designed to contain hydrogen and oxygen at 3000 psi (design factor 2.0)
for RCS and fuel cell operation during build-up (unmanned) operations.
After manning, these tanks will serve as accumulators with a maximum pressure
of 300 psi, resulting in an operating safety margin of 20.
4.6 DOUBLE CONTAINMENT OF HAZARDOUS FLUIDS
The closed ecology cycle and limited volume make the MSS particularly
susceptible to small leaks of hazardous fluids. Dilution of the module
atmosphere with Freon could inhibit crew activities if a concentration of
only 1000 ppm is reached. An increase in hydrogen gas concentration could
reach explosive and fire limits well before cabin overpressure. On the
other hand, release of oxygen would not immediately injury crew members,
unless excessive leakage went undetected and increased the potential fire
hazard. Also, an increase in nitrogen partial pressure would affect the
module overpressure more than the crew.
In addition to indirect means of leak detection, such as pressure
measurement, Frepn and hydrogen tanks and lines are required to be enclosed
in an outer shall for leakage containment. The intermediate volume will be
maintained at pressures near cabin pressure and monitored for increase. Also,
provision for venting this volume^ to space will~be made~~~as~wel~l~~as— provision -
for dumping (to space) of the fluid remaining in the tank.
The electrolysis units are also a source of hydrogen and oxygen. Double-
walled containment is required for this equipment in station modules.
4.7 HATCH PRESSURE EQUALIZATION
Large hatches required for crew egress with a PLSS or IVA suit develop
large forces with small pressure differences. A typical airlock hatch open-
ing in the core module has approximately 2600 square in. area. Handling of
the hatch by a crew member could be hazardous if a residual pressure differ-
ence remained. Since force on the door is directly proportional to the
pressure difference, 0.1 psi difference results in 260 Ib force (Figure 4.7-1).
Three methods of hazard reduction have been used: 1) opening the door
into the normally higher pressure volume , 2) providing a valved opening
between the two compartments, and 3) measuring the pressure difference
accurately. The first provision insures crewman safety by preventing hatch
opening until the crewman strength is sufficient to swing the door against
any remaining pressure difference. A second provision facilitates final
pressure equalization. Electrically activated valving could provide an
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Figure 4.7-1. Force on Hatch-Door Due to A P
opening with minimum crew effort. However, protection around the opening
would have, to be added .to prevent high velocity gas flow and inadvertent
coverage by the crew. The third method relies on sensitive measurements
beyond the crew sensing:capability. A combination of all three would pro-
vide .the safest procedures. Additional methods, such as a mechanical hatch
restraint that cracks the seal before full release, need to be investigated
for optimum design feasibility.
4.8 METEROID PENETRATION
Penetration of.the pressure wall by a meteroid will be a relatively
rare event; however, the potential consequences of such an event must be
considered.
The spacecraft structure is designed for no penetration by a meteroid
defined by a certain probability of occurrence in a particular environment
for the mission duration. Figure 4.8-1 shows the probability of no impact
for a typical modular space station configuration during a 10-year mission.
There is better, than 0.999 probability of no impact by a meteroid larger
than 1 gm.mass and 15 mm ,(0.6 inch) diameter,. and this size meteroid -has
been selected for defining the maximum credible meteroid penetration in the
credible accidents. Such a meteroid would produce approximately 50 BTU's
of energy inside the compartment it penetrated. This energy would be released
in the form of heat, shock waves, and kinetic and thermal energy of finely
divided molten high-speed shrapnel from spallation of the inner wall. This
event was compared in magnitude to an explosion of a hand grenade and may
be expected to injure .personnel in the area, damage equipment, and start
local fires. It also will result in a hole of approximately 2 inches in :
diameter in the pressure wall, approximately equal to the spacing between
the meteroid bumper and the pressure wall.
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The depressurization effect from a penetration will depend on its size
as well as the volume being depressurized. The pressure will decay exponent-
ially with time and the crew will be able to function until a pressure of
approximately 9.1 psi is reached. At this point, the partial pressure of
oxygen will be 1.9 psi, and below this hypoxia may result in unacceptable
levels of crew performance, with degraded visual performance. At a pressure
of approximately 6.0 psi, loss of consciousness may result after a variable
period, depending on individual susceptibility. Decompression sickness (bends)
may occur if the pressure drops below 7.3 psi. Although the onset and course
of this decompression sequence is unpredictable for any one individual, -symptoms
rarely appear during the first few minutes of exposure to the low pressure.
Figure A.8-2 shows the decompression times to 9.1 psi for the maximum
design case of a 2-inch penetration. If a single module were isolated,
approximately five minutes of crew reaction, time would be available for
locating and making a temporary seal or for evacuating and sealing off the
module. If several modules were open to each other, so that all of them
share in the decompression, considerable more reaction time would be avail-
able. Operating the space station with.the hatches open between modules,
therefore, maximized the reaction time in the event of a leak, as well as
allowing quicker access between the modules.
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The 2-inch penetration represents a very severe case which would typi-
cally be encountered once in 10,000 years of space activity. As seen from
Figure 4.8-1, meteroids with a more realistic probability of occurrence are
considerably less massive and of smaller diameter. Although the size of
penetration will not vary much, the energy released does decrease very
rapidly with the size of the meteroid. Meteroids which are just beyond
the structural capability of the primary structure will probably cause
very small penetrations and the problem probably will be in detecting and
locating them rather than in coping with damage.
4.9 DOCKING
Docking operations on both the Gemini and the Apollo programs have
been conducted with a high degree of success. However, the docking problems
encountered on the Apollo 14 flight highlight how failure to dock could have
led to loss of mission. Inability of the shuttle to dock to the space station,
could lead to loss of the station and of the on-board crew if EVA were not
possible. Failure to undock from an attached sortie module or the station
could also cause major problems to both vehicles, possibly leading to loss
of one of the vehicles and to the need for a rescue mission.
The main safety concerns during docking arise from the possibility of
exceeding the design criteria for the docking system. Contact at too high
a velocity could result in damage to the docking mechanism or to the structure
of either of the two vehicles.
The.basic options available in the shuttle and station programs were to
hard dock the shuttle to the station, free-fly and hard dock the payload
(cargo module, experiments module or station modules) to the shuttle and
station, or use manipulators on either shuttle or station for a soft docking
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(berthing). All three methods had safety disadvantages which were factored
into the trade. Hard docking of the shuttle to the station through an exten-
ded cargo module was very sensitive to errors in the docking parameters,
particularly the approach velocity, because of the large masses of the two
vehicles involved. The docking mechanism would have to be designed to absorb
the relative energy at impact based on the maximum likely approach velocity
as measured in simulated dockings with the available control systems.
The sensitivity of the docking maneuver to errors can be evaluated .by
considering the energy that must be absorbed by the docking system. This
is, simply,
ml m2
m..
v2
where mi and m£ are the masses of the two vehicles and V is the relative
approach velocity. The reduced mass term, mj m? is between 50 and 100
m-i+ mo
percent of the mass of the lighter vehicle. Therefore, relatively little
energy has to be absorbed if one or the other of the two vehicles is rela-
tively light (e.g., when the shuttle payload docks in a free-flying mode
to station or shuttle). The energy is also relatively small if the contact
velocity can be kept a low value.
One~of—the~main—advantages—of—manipulators-was—the—low_docking_jv.elocity
that could be achieved, resulting in a lighter weight docking subsystem.
Contact velocities of approximately 0.1 to 0.2 fps could be achieved with
manipulators, compared to 0.5 to 1.0 fps for direct docking. An accidental
collision would therefore be less severe with the manipulators. On the
other hand the docking port designed for manipulator docking would be con-
siderably more sensitive to approach velocity errors than the sturdier
direct docking port.
This susceptibility is illustrated by the following example. The
energy that has to be absorbed on docking is shown for the three docking
methods considered in Table 4.9-1. Two accidents are considered in the
table: in the first one the impact velocity is twice the design velocity
and in the second it is a fixed increment of 0.5 fps higher than the design
velocity. The excess energy that has to be absorbed (by the docking sub-
system and the structure) is particularly large for the direct.docking method
and would be reflected in structural weight. The manipulator system is much
more sensitive to a 0.5 fps error; where the total energy to be absorbed
represents over 12 times the design case. The relative credibility of the
two accidents then influences structural design and weight as well as control
of the closing velocity.
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Table 4.9-1. Energy Absorption for Design Conditions
and Two Accident Situations
Design Contact
Velocity
(fps)
Energy
Absorption
(ft Ib)
Design
. Case
Accident:
2x Design
Velocity
Accident:
Design
Velocity
+0.5 fps
Shuttle to
Station
Hard Dock
1.0
1,725
(E)
6,900
(4xE)
3,880
(2.25xE)
Module to
Station or
Shuttle
Hard Dock
i.o
353
(E)
1,410
(4xE)
795
(2.25xE)
Shuttle to .
Statipn
Manipulator
Soft Dock
0.2. . .
138
(E)
550
(4xE)
1,690
(12.25xE)
Weights: Shuttle = 250,000 Ib
Station = 200,000 Ib
Module = 25,000 Ib
The use of manipulators does make the docking operation safer with
respect to impact damage. However, there are some potential failure modes
associated with the manipulator which could result in loss of a station
module, possibly the shuttle, and possibly the capability to continue the
station program. Some of these situations are:
1. Failure of the shuttle manipulator to move.
2. Failure of the manipulator to stop moving.
3. Failure of the manipulator to grasp the station or a module.
4. Failure of any one docking port on the station where a redundant
port is not available.
5. Failure of the shuttle to dock or undock.
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The safety aspects of the docking options are not conclusive either for
or against any of the options considered. Since adequate safety provisions
can be made for any one of the three modes. The final safety selection can
be made on the basis of which mode is least costly to make safe.
4.10 MANIPULATOR OPERATIONS
An overall analysis was made of the assembly functions to.be performed
by manipulators in order to determine potential single point failures at
the program level.
Examination of the various operational concepts shows that the following
potential failures are critical to building up the'space station, i.e., the
build-up cannot be completed if these failures occur.
1. Shuttle manipulator failure. :
2. Failure of the manipulator "grab" mechanism on the shuttle.
3. Failure of the manipulator "grab" location on the station or
module.
4. Failure of any one berthing port on the station where a redundant
one is not available.
5. Failure to berth or unberth by the shuttle.
6. Failure to bertlr~or~unberth—the-shuttle-doeki-ng— adaptor—to_and_
from either the shuttle or the station.
Any of the above failures which cannot be circumvented by backup functions,
becomes a single point failure to the program.
Analysis shows that there are potential means, some easily implemented
and some difficult or undesirable, to prevent every one of the above six
failures being single point program failures. The requirements for doing
so are listed below; the number in the right hand column shows which of the
six failures above drive the requirement. Where different requirements can
be implemented, a generalized requirement is first stated, with the specific
options indicated by the subscripts a, b, c. The asterisk ( )* indicates
requirements which prevent single point failures leading to loss of a single
module rather than the whole Space Station Program.
Failure
Driving
Requirement Reqmts.
1)* Provide backup means for returning module to shuttle cargo 1
in the event of shuttle manipulator failure.
2)* Provide backup release on shuttle manipulator (required for 1&2
shuttle safety, anyway).
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3)* Provide multiple "grab" locations on each module.
4) Provide multiple "grab" locations on the station at each
stage of build-up.
5) Provide continuation of build-up following damage to or
malfunction of power module berthing port.
5a)* Provide two berthing ports on power module
or 5b)* Provide EVA capability to repair/replace/add-on
berthing port on power module
or 5c) Provide backup power module in program and design
core module for survival until it can be brought
up to orbit
or 5d)* Design power module for return to Earth for repair,
and design core module for survival until power
module can br brought up again.
6) Provide a backup berthing port on the station at each stage
of buildup, which allows shuttle berthing and a continuation
of buildup.
7) Provide continuation of buildup following damage to or mal-
function of core module berthing port for berthing to
power module.
7a)* Provide two berthing ports (for power module) on
core module
or 7b)* Provide capability to maintain berthing port and
mechanism (for power module) on core module in
orbit
or 7c) Provide backup core module in program and design
power module to survive until it can be brought
up to orbit
or 7d)* Design power module to survive until core module
can be returned to Earth, repaired, and returned
to orbit.
8) Provide continuation of build-up following damage to or
malfunction of berthing port on a common module.
Failure
Driving
Reqrots.
3
3
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8a)* Provide for survival of each stage of partially
built-up station until module can be returned to
Earth, repaired, and brought up to orbit again
or 8b) Provide backup of each common module in program,
and design for survival of each stage of partially
built-up station until backup module can be brought
up to orbit
or 8c)* Design common modules for berthing at either end;
i.e., two berthing ports per module
or 8d)* Provide capability to maintain ports and mechanisms
on common modules in orbit.
9) Provide continuation of build-up following damage to or
malfunction of berthing port on core module.
9a) Provide one more berthing port on each pressure
isolatable volume of the core module than is
required for normal build-up, capable of berthing
any planned common module. Provide an emergency
pressure-tight cover for damaged, leaking core
or
Failure
Driving
Reqmts.
module docking ports
9b) Provide capability to maintain berthing ports and
mechanisms on core module in orbit.
5&6
5&6
10) provide for survival of station until backup shuttle
arrival in orbit.
11) Provide backup means for release of berthing ports.
In arriving at these requirements, it was assumed that a failure of a
particular shuttle mission does not constitute program failure, and that the
abandonment of any one station module in orbit is highly undesxrable. It
abandonment of one module is acceptable, the requirements identified with
an asterisk are not needed.
A review of the above potential requirements to determine which are
practical and desirable was made. It is recommended that the requirements
underlined (e.g., 1) be included in the SRB.
Of these, four potentially difficult requirements to implement are:
- Provide backup means for returning module to shuttle cargo bay
in the event of shuttle manipulator failure.
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- Provide backup power module in program or design power module for
return to Earth for repair; and design core module for survival
until power module can be brought up to orbit again.
- Provide a backup berthing port on the station at each stage of
buildup, which allows shuttle berthing and a continuation of
buildup.
- Provide one more berthing port on each pressure isolatable volume
of the core module than is required for normal buildup, capable
of berthing any planned common module. Provide an emergency
pressure-tight cover for damaged, leaking core module docking
ports.
It may be programmatically acceptable to dispense with the first two
requirements, thus accepting the. following single point failures:
a) Inability of shuttle manipulator to berth a module to station,
or return it to shuttle cargo bay. Rationale; This would lead,
at worst, to loss of one station module.
b) Damage to or malfunction of power module berthing port, preventing
berthing to core module. Rationale; Although this could lead
to loss of the subsequent station program, it is a once-only
operation with a high probability of success.
The last two requirements are considered a "must" however, since loss
or damage of at least one berthing port is considered quite likely during
the station program. It would therefore be unacceptable to have loss of
any one berthing port constitute a single point failure.'
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